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DEFENCES AGAINST TAKEOVERS 
1.00 INTRODUCTION 
This paper will deal with the practical steps available to a company 
("the target company") in order to make that company less likely to incu r 
a significant change of ownership (1) instigated by another person or 
company ("the raider") without the Directors of the target company being 
consulted and in agreement with such change of ownership. 
2.00 BACKGROUND TO TAKEOVERS 
2.10 Genera1(2): 
Takeover activity is seen as one of the many variables affecting the 
general performance of the share market for publicly listed companies . 
(1) This can be less than a 50% shareholding of a company. 
( 2) The Commerce Commission received 279 merger or takeover proposals in the 
first year of operation of the Commerce Amendment Act 1983 - The Evening 
Post 24 April 1985. These figures exclude takeovers not within the 
terms of the Commerce Act 1975 (as amended) . 
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Economic and Social Arguments - Takeovers - Benefit or Burden? 
Whether takeovers are a benefit or a burden to the community and the 
companies involved is presently a topical issue.(3) 
Takeovers can be perceived from many different perspectives, such as: 
(i) The Community at large. It may be believed that takeovers assist 
in the rationalisation of unproductive industry and increase 
efficiency and growth in the corporate sector. Alternatively, 
takeovers can be seen as wasting resources that could be better 
spent els&here thus affecting the community at large not merely 
the companies involved (eg employment etc). 
(ii) The Companies involved. The shareholders of the target companies 
if their shares are purchased by a raider, almost always profit 
and the threat of takeovers keep the existing management of a 
target company on their mettle. However, some people may believe 
that the defences implemented are more likely to be in the 
interests of the existing management of the target company rather 
than the company itself and both raider and target company may be 
worse off after the takeover battle, regardless of whether the 
takeover is successful. 
See: J. Greenwald "The Great Takeover Debate" TIME 22 April 1985 page 
30; The Evening Post 29 January 1985 page 8 an article headed "Treasury 
Flaws Takeover Reform"; The Evening Post 17 October 1984 page 24 an 
article headed "Takeover Companies Fare No Better; M. Firth "Takeovers 
Benefit or Burden" (1981)62 The Industrial Analyst page 29; J. Greenwald 
"Bigger Yes, But Better?" TIME 12 August 1985 page 32; The Dominion 12 
August 1985 page 13 an article by T. Hall headed "Too many on the 
takeover trail"; and Peter Dodd "The Financial Economics View of 
Regulation of Mergers and Takeovers" and C. I. Patterson II Company 
Takeovers - Proposals For Reform" both papers presented at the Seminar on 
Mergers and Takeovers, Victoria University of Wellington organised by the 
Department of Accountancy, 29th August 1985. 
• 
• 
' 
' 
' 
'I 
' ' 
' 
-3-
2.30 General Legal Framework for Takeovers: 
( 4) 
( 5) 
There is no comprehensive legislative scheme regulating takeovers in New 
Zealand. (4) 
Existing New Zealand Takeover Law: 
2.31 The Companies Act 1955 and the Companies Amendment Act 1963. (5) 
Hogg C.G.G. 11 A Takeover Law for New Zealand - an American Perspective" 
(1985)15 Victoria University Law Review (V.U.L.R.) 101,102. See also an 
article "Takeover Laws are Outdated" (1983) the Ne~v Zealand Financial 
Reviev/ September p.68 (unauthored), and P.E. Ratner "Company Takeovers" 
(1984) NZLJ 5, and T.R. Hurst 11 Self Regulation versus Regulation" (1984)5 
The Company Lawyer 4 No. 4 page 161 (UK). 
One must not forget the rights of the minority shareholders in a takeover 
situation - see H. Bond 11 The Statutory Protection of Minority 
Shareholders" (1984) 5 The Company Lawyer No. 4 page 155 (UK). 
• 
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This legislation governs the procedures for making a takeover 
offer(6) (as defined in that Act) and covers certain other matters 
relevant to takeovers, principally the following:(?) 
(a) Provisions dealing with payments to company directors (ss. 
191-194). 
(b) Provisions prohibiting a company from financing the 
purchase or assisting in the purchase of its own shares 
(SS. 62). 
( C) 
( d) 
Provisions enabling the compulsory acquisition of the 
outstanding remainder of shares after a takeover (s.208). 
Provisions for the amalgamation and reconstruction of 
companies (ss. 205-207). 
However this legislation in practice has very limited 
application(8) because of class of transactions exempted (9) and 
because it only applies to written takeover offers.(10) 
See the Securities Commission Report "Discussion and Proposals for Reform 
- Company Takeovers" - A Review of the Law and Practice Volume 1 dated 5 
October 1983 ("the Securities Commission Report") paragraphs 3.2 to 3.15. 
Hogg C.G.G. supra n.4. page 104 - The Securities Commission Report supra 
n.6 para 3.16. 
(8) Hogg C.G.G. supra page 103 and the Securities Commission Report para 3.4. 
(9) The exempted transactions are: 
(10) 
(i) the acquisition of shares in a private company where all the 
offerees have waived the requirements of the 1963 Amendment; and 
(ii) an offer as part of a "takeover scheme" to six or fewer 
shareholders. 
The concept of written offer has been narrowly defined by the Courts -See 
Multiplex v. Spear [1966] NZLR 122,150; Carter Holt Holdings Limited v. 
Fletcher Holdings Limited [1980] NZLR 80,86, and Tatra Industries Limited 
v. Scott Group Limited (1983) NZCLC 95,079. 
• 
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2.32 The Commerce Act 1975 (Part III)(ll) 
The main purpose of the Commerce Act is to regulate the markets 
for, and dealings in, goods and services other than securities, 
and impactfupon securities law for the better attainment of that 
main purpose. 02) 
Part III establishes a takeover review procedure which is confined 
to monopoly and competition (antitrust) considerations. (13) 
(11) None of the following structural details will be significantly change
d by 
the Commerce Bill 1985 (No. 104-1) other than the asset threshold levels 
as described below. 
(12) The Securities Commission Report n.6 para 3.l(b). See also the paper
s by 
John Collinge, Chairman of the Commerce Commission, "Merger and Takeover 
Policy and Procedures in New Zealand" and M. Hill 
11 The Evolution of New 
Zealand Merger Control and its Administration By the Office of the 
Examiner of Commercial Practices" presented to a seminar on Mergers and 
Takeovers in 1984 at the University of Canterbury, and the paper by J. 
Collinge "Towards A Competition Policy in New Zealand" at the seminar on 
Mergers and Takeovers in 1985 at the Victoria University of Wellington. 
(13) Hogg C.G.G.supra n.4 page 104. 
• 
• 
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Generally speaking the Commerce Act review procedure applies to 
11 takeover proposals 11 for the acquisition of 20 per cent or more of 
the target's shareholding. The Commerce Act does not generally 
apply to takeovers involving smaller companies because asset 
threshold levels for the participants in the takeover must be met 
before such takeover requires prior clearance or authorisation by 
the Commerce Commission. (14) 
The necessary consent, if required, by the raider in a takeover 
situation is normally obtained prior to the attack on the target 
company or the offer made by the raider is stated to be subject to 
such consent being obtained. The Commerce Commission does not 
require mandatory disclosure of a bid by a raider to either the 
target company or its shareholders when applying for Commerce 
Commission consent. 
2.33 The Securities Act 1978: 
The Securities Act established the Securities Commission and the 
regulation of the terms under which 11 securities 11 may be advertised 
and offered to the public. 
The definition of 11 securities 11 is very wide (15) and would include 
shares. 
Presently in the case of a merger and takeover proposal involving not 
more than 2 participants, the value of the assets of the smaller 
participant must be at least $2,500,000 and the aggregate value of the 
assets of all the participants must be at least $20,000,000 before the 
Commerce Act 1975 provisions apply (under the Commerce Bill 1985 those 
figures would be increased to $5,000,000 and $50,000,000 respectively). 
See also J. Collinge 11 Merger and Takeover Procedures under the Commerce 
Act 11 (1985) NZLJ 260. 
(15) See Sections 2 and 5 of the Securities Act 1978 and Chapter 4 of Darvell 
and Clarke Securities Law in New Zealand Butterworths 1983. 
• 
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The Securities Act provisions may be relevant if a takeover offer 
was made by 11 standing in the market 11 (15A), and instead of 
offering cash, offered shares of the raider or a third party. It 
may be argued in such circumstances that a prospectus is required 
to be issued (l5B) 
The Securities Commission may also investigate a takeover or 
defensive strategies employed under its general 
jurisdiction. (15C) 
2.34 The Overseas Investment Act 1973 
The Overseas Investment Act 1973 and Regulations under that Act 
set out procedures for the implementation of national policies 
relating to overseas investment in New Zealand companies by 
persons who reside overseas. 
A takeover offer within the meaning of Part I of the Companies Amendment 
Act 1963 (i.e. in writing) is deemed not to be an offer of securities to 
the public - Section 3(2)(c) of the Securities Act 1978. 
This type of argument has been raised successfully in Australia see 
Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd v. Bell Resources Ltd [1984]8ACLR 609. 
See also G.J. Samuel 11 Takeovers and Public Securities 11 (1984)2 Company and 
Securities Law Journal No. 2 page 124 (Aust), N. O'Bryan 11 Takeover 
Offers and Prospectus Requirements'' (1985)3 Company and Securities Law 
Journal No. 1 page 3, and the case Australian Central Credit Union v. 
Corporate Affairs Commission (SA) [1985] 9 ACLR 718 (This case is under 
appeal -Companies and Securities Bulletin June 1985 14 [Aust]). 
(15C) City Realties Limited v. Securities Commission [1982]1 NZLR 74 (CA). 
See also C. Cripps 11 Company Takeovers - Too Many Tribunals Not Enough 
Remedies 11 (1982) NZLJ 395. 
• 
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2.35 N.Z. Stock Exchange Listing Manual ("The Stock Exchange Code"): 
The manual sets out in Section 6 of the Takeover Code for 
companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
Section 6 covers the following matters (16): 
(a) Disclosure of the terms of a bid should be made to the 
target Board of Directors and shareholders of the target 
company. (17). 
(b) A general restriction on insider trading (18). 
(c) A general restriction of defensive tactics that may be 
undertaken by the Board of Directors of the target 
company, stated as follows: 
"The offeree [target] Board is not to take action to thwart 
an offer unless it honestly believes that acceptance is not 
in the best interests of shareholders ... 11 (19) 
(d) Details of proration for partial bids and increases in 
offering price. (20) 
See Hogg C.G.G. supra n.4 pages 104-105. These will not be significantly 
altered by recent proposed changes presently being discussed - letter 
from the New Zealand Stock Exchange - 29.5.85. 
Paragraph 607 of the Stock Exchange Code. 
Paragraph 602 and 603 of the Stock Exchange Code. 
See also C.I. Patterson "Insider trading and business ethics" (1984) 
NZLJ 369. 
Paragraph 609 of the Stock Exchange Code. 
Paragraph 613 of the Stock Exchange Code. See N.Z. Forest Products 
Limited v. New Zealand Stock Exchange (1984)2 NZCLC 99,051 (High Court) & 
[1984]1 NZLR 699 (Court of Appeal). 
• 
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The language of Section 6 is general and precatory rather than 
specific and mandatory(21). The Code operates only as a contract 
among listed companies and brokers.(22) Sanction for breaching 
the Code is limited to the delisting of a Company's securities<23) 
or disciplining a broker.(23A) 
(21) Hogg C.G.G. supra n.4 Page 105. 
(22) Hogg C.G.G. supra n.4 Page 105. See Stock Exchange Association of New 
Zealand v. Commerce Commission [1980] 1 NZLR 663 and N.Z. Forest Products 
Limited v. New Zealand Stock Exchange supra n.20. 
(23) Examples: N.Z. Forest Products Limited in 1984 concerning takeover 
triangle of NZFP, Goodmans and Watties. Waitaki NZR when BIL was seeking 
a 15% shareholding and Waitaki NZR issued an option for shares to a third 
party. 
(23A) Paragraph 108 of the Stock Exchange Code and the Listing Agreement. 
• 
• 
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One commentator has noted that delisting may hurt most those whom the 
Code seeks to protect - shareholders of the target company (24), In 
addition that commentator noted that the Code is powerless against a 
raider being a private company. (25) 
Delisting may in fact be sought by a target company so that it is more 
difficult to trade the target company's shares. Richard Carter, Managing 
Director of Carter Holt Limited is reported as saying: 
"Do anything to delay [a takeover bid]. Do something that• s 
strong enough to get delisted. Go that far without hesitation. 
If you're delisted they can't trade shares. Do anything, worry 
about the court cases afterwards. Do it in such a way that you 
can wind it back whenever you want to, ... 11 (25A) 
(24) Hogg C.G.G. supra Page 105. The commentator also referred to the case of 
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc. [1984] Fed. Sec. L.Rep (CCH) 94, 564 
(2nd Cir, 27th June 1984) where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
regarded delisting as ipso facto causing injury to shareholders. 
Another commentator believed the power of deli sting relatively impotent 
-see Forbes C.W. - "Defensive Tactics in the Face of an Unwanted Takeover 
Offer" University of Auckland 1980 (a paper in partial fulfilment of an 
LLM). 
(25) Hogg C.G.G. supra n.4. Page 105. 
(25A) The New Zealand Times 7.7.85 
( 
• 
• 
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The Common Law 
The Common Law (eg conspiracy, fraud, misrepresentation) may be 
relevant, however it is unusual if it arises in takeovers.(26) 
The fudiciary duty on Directors of the target company is 
important.(26A) The Dire~ors must act in the best interests of 
the company as a whole(26B) rather than motivated by the desire to 
protect their own position.(27) 
As the Common Law is alway being reinterpreted the Directors of 
the target company should retain legal advisors who can give 
counsel as to a Directois fudiciary duty when contemplating 
implementing strategies as defences to takeovers. 
(26) Hogg C.G.G. supra n.6 page 103. See however Trounce and Another v. 
N.C.F. Kaiapoi Limited (High Court Christchurch 11 June 1985 [A183/85] 
Heron J.) and Baigent v. D.McL. Wallace (1984)2 NZCLC 99,122. 
(26A) D. Gonski and P. Keenan "Legal Protection and Vulnerabilities for the 
Corporation" (pages 2-6) presented at a conference on Defence Against 
Takeovers : The Corporate Response held in Sydney 17.9.85 (Australia). 
(268) For the benefit of current and future shareholders, employees and 
creditors (as to creditors see Nicholson & Ors v. Permakraft (NZ)(In Liq) 
(1985)3 ACLR 453 D. Gonski and P. Keenan supra n.26A page 2. 
(27) Hogg v. Cramphorn Limited [1967]Ch. 254, Hov,ard Smith Ltd v. Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd [1974JA.C. 821 (PC) and Cayne v. Global Natural Resources 
Plc (Chancery Division, 12 August, 1982 unreported, but see (1982)56 ALJ 
600 and D. Gonski and P. Kennan supra n.26A page 3. See also Weinberg 
and Blank on Takeovers and Mergers (2 ed., Sweet and Maxwell London 1979) 
paragraph 2401, Y. Danziger and K. Skoyles "The Right of Target Companies 
to use Corporate Funds in Defence of Takeover" (1985)5 The Company Lawyer 
No. 5 page 217 (UK) and papers by R. Halstead "Directors' Duties and Long 
Term Defence Strategies" and P. Mason "Directors' Duties and Long Term 
Defence Strategies to deter Attackers" (pages 1-3) presented at a seminar 
on Takeovers Mergers and Acquisitions held in Sydney 12.7.85 (Australia) 
see also paragraph 609 of the Stock Exchange Code. 
• 
• 
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3.00 DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES BEFORE A TAKEOVER BID IS IMMINENT 
3.01 Recognition that 11 YOU 11 Are A Possible Target: 
Before any defence strategies are useful there must be the recognition by 
the target company that 11 IT" is a possible target and that it believes 
defensive strategies are appropriate. (27A) 
Defensive strategies should be implemented before a takeover bid is 
imminent if they are to be the most effective . 
No company, big or small, is free from a possible takeov er . (2 78) 
However, effective prevention is best achieved by individuals ho l din g, 
directly or indirectly, more than 50 per cent of the i r compan ies.(27C) 
(27A) See for background R.T. Lang, D.J. Block, N.E. Barton and G.K. 
Duberstein 11 The Dramatizat ion of a Hostile Tender Offer" American Bar 
Journal (1984) Volume 70 March pages 68-73 and Apri 1 72-77. 
(278) Sir Ronald Trotter - Chairman Fletcher Challenge Limited has been 
reported as saying: 
11 
••• any company can be vulnerable to takeover unless it performed 
well, had good profits and kept shareholders fully informed". The 
Dominion 5.7.85. 
(27C) P. Mason supra n.27 (pages 3-4) 
S. Higgs, W. Chant and R. Halstead "Takeover Defence : The Management 
Response" a paper presented to a conference on Defence Against Takeovers 
: The Corporate Response held in Sydney 18.9.85 (page 3). 
-13-
To ascertain whether 11 YOU 11 are a target for a takeover continuous 
monitoring of the following is required: 
(a) shares owned by management 
(b) analysis of how shares are held - type of shareholder 
(c) shareholder disenchantment 
(d) undervalued or suplus assets 
(e) unattractive balance sheet 
(f) undergearing 
(g) underperforming businesses 
(h) current market price v. future prospects 
(i) other acquisitions in the industry.(270) 
3.10 Anticipatory Strategies/Be Prepared: 
3.11 Watch on Share Registry: 
A close watch should be kept on the register of shareholders and 
movements in the shares should be noted with a view to ascertaining 
whether either there is an unusual turnover and/or whether a large number 
of shares appear to be accumulating in the hands of one person or 
company. (28) It may not be easy to identify the person of company if use 
is made by the raider of nominees. 
(270) Memorandum headed "Issues Relating to Responses to Unsolicited Offers 
[Under Delaware Law], by Sullivan and Cromwell, a New York law firm, 
dated Apri 1 23 1985, pages 26-27 ( 11 Su 11 iv an and Cromwe 11 11 ). R. A. Ross 
"Profile of the Target Company: the Defence before the Defence" a paper 
presented to a Conference on Defence Against Takeovers : The Corporate 
Response held in Sydney 17.9.85 (page 2). 
(28) S. Lofthouse "Strategy and Tactics for Resisting Takeover" (1984) Long 
Range Planning (UK) Volume 17 No. 4 page 38, 43. L. Goodman "Contingency 
Planning for a Takeover Bid" (1981) Finance Director's Review (UK) Vol. 1 
No. 24 page 185. 
• 
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The Stock Exchange Code provisions allowing a company to ascertain the 
beneficial owner of shares in certain circumstances (29) are not likely 
to be of assistance (30) as the raider may not be a New Zealand listed 
public company, the raider may be a private company not caught by the 
Code provisions (31) or the target company may not have brought its 
Articles of Association line with the powers allowed by the Code. 
Paragraph 453(2)(3) of the Stock Exchange Code. The Code allows a company 
to provide in its Articles that a statutory declaration specifying the 
beneficial owner of shares may be required by the Directors of the 
Company in certain circumstances relating to the transfer of shares (for 
example if the transfer relates to shares comprising 0.5% or more of the 
company's issuedshares of their class or the registration of the transfer 
would result in the transferee holding 1% or more of the company's issued 
shares of their case.) 
(30) See the example of the mystery buyer of AHI shares a couple of days prior 
to the Carter Holt bid for AHI. The Securities Commission investigated 
this matter seemingly to ascertain whether there had been any ''insider 
trading". The Securities Commission are reported as knowing who the 
buyer was however the Chairman is reported as saying: 
"Under the law as it stands, the buyer is not required to reveal his 
identity" - The Dominion 3/5/85, an Article by T. Withers headed "Mystery 
AHI buyer uncovered". See also discussion of the recent mystery bidder 
for part of the capital of CPD the Article by J. Cliffton headed "CPD 
chairman hits 'masked men"' The Dominion 28/8/85 (page 17). 
(31) It may be useful to ensure that there is an Article in the company's 
Articles of Association, which disenfranchises any nominee who fails to 
disclose the beneficial ownership of the shares. L. Goodman supra n.28 
page 186. See paragraph 3.32 of this paper. 
• 
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A list of nominee companies and their beneficial owners and a list of 
firms of brokers/solicitors noting their major clients should be 
maintained. If the takeover vehicle is a "shell" private company then it 
is likely that the raider's brokers/solicitors provided such a "shell" 
company. Searching the "shell" company should provide the information of 
which firm of solicitors acts for or formed the company. Therefore, 
knowing the firm's major clients may allow the target company to make an 
educated guess as to the person or company behind the "shell" company. A 
list of major clients of sharebrokers should also be obtained so that the 
target company can make another educated guess who each broker is likely 
to be acting for if purchasing significant shares in the target 
company. ( 32) 
Signals from Share Registry: 
Signals that a person or company is acquiring a significant shareholding 
in the target company include: 
(a) An accumulation of shares in one or more nominee names; 
(b) a broker persistently buying in the market; 
(c) underlying strong tone to the share price and possibly relative 
outperformance of the share price; 
(d) unusually large number of transactions in the shares of the 
target; and 
(e) a request for a list of shareholders(33). 
The target company should remember that a raider may defer registering 
share transfers.(33A) 
(32) Note however the case of the takeover of Allied Mills in Australia w
here 
Apex Limited used the same broker as that used by Industrial Equity 
Limited ( 11 I.E.L. 11 ) as it was "hoped by using the same broker as IEL 
[Apex] might throw some confusion into the market" - The Dominion 4th 
June 1985. 
(33) S. Lofthouse, supra n.28 page 43. A. Vrisakis and G. Samuel "The De
fence 
Strategy" a paper presented to a conference on Defence Against Takeovers 
: The Corporate Response held in Sydney 18.9.85 (page 4). 
(33A) A. Vrisakis and G. Samuel ibid comment received on the paper. 
• 
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It is advisable that systems be established with the target's brokers and 
registrar to provide the necessary information on the signals to be 
watched quickly.(34) 
Shareholders - The Key to a Defence/Surveillance of Type of Shareholders: 
The key to a successful takeover defence is to motivate shareholders not 
to accept a takeover offer.(34A) If the shareholders of the target 
company believe the Board of Directors are achieving the shareholder's 
goals (eg financial, secure employment) then any offer will be 
rejected.(34B) The shareholders must have confidence in the Board of 
Directors of the target company and a "good track record" gives the Board 
of Directors credibility.(34C) 
It is also very useful for the target company to maintain surveillance of 
the type of shareholders present at any one time. (35) The type of 
shareholders being: 
(i) Private individual shareholders. 
(ii) Institutional shareholders being: 
(a) pension/superannuation managers and their companies. 
(b) insurance company managers and fund managers. 
(iii) Other companies being: 
(a) investment companies 
(b) other companies. 
L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. 
(34A) P. Mason "The Key to a Defence Strategy" a paper presented to a 
conference on Defence Against Takeovers : The Corporate Response held in 
Sydney 17.9.85 (page 1). 
(34B) P. Mason ibid page 2. 
(34C) P. Mason ibid page 2. 
(35) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. 
• 
• 
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It seems some shareholders are sometimes less likely to sell their shares 
if approached by a raider which has not got the target Board's approval. 
Previously private individual shareholders, not dealers in the market, 
seem to have consistently shown intense loyalty to the Board of Directors 
of Companies in which they are investors(36) however "shareholder 
loyalty" should not be assumed in today's economic climate.(36A) Also 
insurance company fund managers tend to take a longer term view of their 
shareholdings compared to superannuation fund managers who are under 
pressure to demonstrate the superior performance of their funds in the 
short term as compared with the other funds.(37) 
(36) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. 
(36A) Discussion on the paper presented by P. Mason supra n.34A. 
(37) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. 
( 
• 
• 
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Although a Board of Directors cannot choose its shareholders it can 
encourage certain potential buyers of shares while, of course, taking the 
usual care not to alienate other existing or potential shareholders.(38) 
The Board could do one or more of the following(39): 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
On a rights issue placing or other equity issue, an underwriting 
list or list of places might be prepared with an order of pre-
ference . 
The target Company's brokers may be requested that in the normal 
course of business they might offer shares in the target company 
which come on the market to certain preferred institutions before 
others. 
(iii) Particular institutions may be encouraged to take an interest in 
the target company through meetings with senior management or 
visits to the operation.(40) 
(38) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. 
S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42. 
(39) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. 
(40) See an article appearing in The Dominion 5/7/85 which noted that Fletcher 
Challenge Limited ( 11 FCL 11 ) management was to make a trip to the UK 
seemingly in an effort to increase its shareholding by UK Investors. 
Also recently BHP senior management has been visiting the USA to speak to 
possible investing institutions (The Dominion May 1985). Overseas 
shareholding may potentially be risky if the target company's currency 
devalues as against the currency of the overseas shareholding. This has 
happened in 1984/85 with the Australian$ and the United States$. BHP
1 s 
U.S. shareholders may now be keen to dispose of their shares. (See The 
Business Review Weekly June 7 1985 page 14-19). 
( 
• 
• 
• 
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The target company may encourage private shareholdings by 
offering some form of perk to shareholders. (41) 
(v) The target company may encourage employee shareholders who 
naturally place importance on security of employment.(41A) 
(vi) Customers or suppliers may be offered shares and they would 
seek ancilliary benefits (eg rebates and discounts).(41B) 
(vii) Seek to obtain favourable press comment for the target 
company. This can be influential in attracting private 
individual shareholders. 
(41) Perks include: bonus issues, rights issues at a deep discount, dividend 
reinvestment schemes, returns of capital, spin-offs and rights to new 
issues of shares of associate companies (P. Mason supra n.27 page 4 and 
R.A. Ross supra n.270 page 14). Smaller shareholders like bonus issues 
(P. Mason supra n.34A page 1). It seems experience suggests that the 
market responds more positively to an issue with a small bonus element 
coupled with a separate bonus issue than to an equivalent larger bonus 
element in the rights issue (R.A. Ross supra n.270 page 14). 
For example recently Queenstown Resorts Limited which gave shareholders 
discount cards for use at its hotel establishments (New Zealand Times 
23 June 1985 page 15). 
(41A) P. Mason supra n.34A page 1. 
(418) P. Mason ibid. 
• • 
• 
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3.14 Market Rumours: 
A target company should monitor market rumours and request that their 
broker immediately pass on rumours concerning the company.(42) A broker 
may note unusual market activity which would not be apparent to an 
outsider, which the broker should be requested to report as soon as 
possible.(43) Surveillance of newspapers and market journals should also 
be maintained by the target company . 
3.15 Abortive Merger Talks/Announce Talks: 
A target company may have been approached by another company concerning 
"exploring areas of mutual interest" and, if rebuffed as to a merger, 
other company may go directly to the target company's shareholders.(44) 
The target company, once approached, may issue a press statement stating 
that an informal approach has been made and the results of the 
discussions. This is only worth doing if there is an indication that an 
opposed takeover bid will be made, if necessary, by the other party. The 
press statement will probably increase the target company's share price 
and give the target company the initiative. Major shareholders can be 
approached before the raider has a case presented and a bid price 
established.(45) 
(42) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 44. 
(43) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 44. 
(44) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 pages 43-44. 
(45) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43. See paragraph 509 of the Stock Exchange 
Code which sets out certain obligations on a listed company to notify the 
Stock Exchange when officers of the Company become aware of a firm offer 
for a significant part of the Company's issued capital. 
• 
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3.16 Select Top Advisors: 
A target company should ensure their broker, commercial banker, merchant 
banker, auditors, solicitors and public relations consultants are skilled 
in the takeover field.(46) This may involve a change from the target 
company's usual advisor in a particular profession. Regular liaison 
between advisors and the target company should be maintained. 
Takeovers are now commonly carried out with full press coverage. Bad 
press coverage, even if the takeover bid is unsuccessful, could cause 
harm to the company's public image and/or its share price. This could 
make the target company even more vulnerable to another raider. 
Overseas, and the writer believes increasingly in New Zealand, the 
target company's merchant bank carries the brunt of responsibility in a 
defence to a takeover. The target company therefore should have 
developed a good understanding with its merchant bank. This applies to a 
somewhat lesser extent to the target company's broker.(47) 
(46) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43. 
"[ITT Corporation] has been readying its defences against marauders ... 
shortly after it cut its dividend by two-thirds. ITT has neither 
instituted staggered terms for its board members [see paragraph 3.3(i) of 
this paper] or handed out golden parachutes [see paragraph 3.41 of this 
paper] ... but ... [it] has lined up top legal, investment banking, and 
public relations help to plot defensive measures ... "Business Week 17th 
December 1984 page 66. 
(47) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. 
• 
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A target company may also wish to obtain a line of credit from its 
merchant bank or trading bank which could be called upon in the event of 
a takeover bid. Such funds may be needed if the target is to utilise the 
various defence strategies mentioned later in this paper.(47A) 
The management of a target company should also take steps to develop 
their professional relationship with particular shareholders (especially 
institutions), involving meetings and/or visits given by senior 
management of the target company with those particular shareholders. The 
target company's public relations consultant should be utilised in order 
that these meetings and/or visits are carried out professionally and 
show the target company in the best possible light. (48) 
It is preferable that the target company's advisors assess its 
vulnerability to a takeover offer at the earliest possible stage(48A) and 
set in motion a number of strategies to be persued by the target 
company.(488) It can be critical, when under pressure from a raider, 
that the advisors know the target company, its philosophy, style and key 
management.(48C) 
(47A) See paragraph 3.100 (Raise the Dividend), 3.130 (Buy Assets, and 4.05 
(Bid for raider). 
(48) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 41. 
(48A) L.A. Bytheway 11 The Advisors : The Corporate Perspective" a paper 
presented to a conference on Defence Against Takeovers : The Corporate 
Response held in Sydney 17.9.85 (page 2). This is important for takeover 
defence strategies and also because it is better that defence strategies 
be employed prior to a takeover bid when considering the fudiciary duties 
of the Directors of the target company. 
(488) L.A. Bytheway supra n.48A page 2. 
(48C) L.A. Bytheway supra n.48A page 2. 
• 
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3.17 Up-to-Date Information Maintained: 
A target company must be able to produce management accounting and 
financial information at short notice. Forecasts of profit and cash flow 
details may be required at short notice (possibly to be vetted by 
financial advisors). (49) 
If the target owns substantial assets it may be wise to obtain, and keep 
up to date, independent valuations. Such information may be used to 
support the target's share price or justify a higher share price. 
It is also useful for a target company to have (i) a regularly updated 
pro-forma announcement for release to shareholders of the target company 
if a takeover bid eventuates capable of being fine-tuned, printed and 
despatched quickly and (ii) a documented history of the target company's 
financial performance, including earnings and dividends per share and 
bonus and rights issues which it is hoped illustrate the target company's 
share value growth.(49A) 
(49) L. Goodman supra n.28 page 186, Weinberg and Blank n.27 paragraph 1370, 
L.A. Bytheway supra n.48A page 5, and see also R. Grant "Company 
Valuations as a Basis for Defence Strategies" a paper presented to a 
conference on Defence Against Takeovers : The Corporate Response Sydney 
18.9.85. 
(49A) L.A. Bytheway supra n.48A page 5. 
• 3 .18 
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Proxies: 
The target should also form a proxy list in order that, as far as 
possible, senior management and the Directors of the target know which 
major shareholders normally give their proxies to the company's 
directors. Agreement "in principle" could be tentatively arranged for 
proxies for defensive strategies contemplated by the target. A takeover 
attempt by solicitation of proxies for shareholders votes ("proxy 
contests'') may possibly eventuate in New Zealand in the near future.(51) 
Powers of Attorney/Decisions in Defence/Information on Raiders: 
Powers of Attorney should be obtained from Directors of the target 
company to be held in case the takeover bid occurs while one or more 
di rectors are absent. ( 52) 
(51) C.G.G. Hogg supra n.4 page 116: 
"It is not improbable that New Zealand will soon experience this 
method of seeking to gain corporate control by soliciting voters, 
given that the cash expenditure in seeking control by soliciting 
proxies is likely to be much less than in a tender offer [on 
market takeover]". 
In the United States both the raider and the target company normally 
employ proxy solicitors. 
(52) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 page 575 footnote 4. 
• 
• 
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Also key senior management should be clear who does what and when if a 
bid does eventuate (53) in order that the target's response is not 
confused, such key senior management must remain up-to-date with the 
target company's takeover policy. Obviously, as confidentiality is 
critical, the number of key management involved in the target company's 
takeover policy should be limited in size.(53A) 
It is important that a committee of the Board of the Directors of the 
target company or key management is appointed with sufficient delegated 
authority to make decisions without constant need to refer back to the 
full Board of Directors, except on fundamental policy matters.(53B) 
Information on envisaged raiders should be compiled.(54) This 
information should be financial (eg especially if a competitor), legal 
(eg what defences have they in their Articles of Association), and other 
relevant information (eg shareholding - vulnerable to a counter takeover 
bid?). 
3.20 Increase the Share Price/Information to the Market 
(53) 
(53A) 
(53B) 
(54) 
(55) 
"Managements use various methods and schemes to protect themselves from a 
possible takeover. However, there is an absolute way to avoid a 
takeover : Bring the company's market price as close to appraised value 
as possible, and then maintain it. That eliminates any problems with 
outside threats." (55) 
S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43. 
Sullivan and Cromwell supra n.27D page 27. 
Sullivan and Cromwe 11 supra n.27D page 27. 
Sullivan and Cromwell supra n.27D page 27. 
L. Goodman supra n.28 page 187. 
T. Boone Pickens, Jr. (President of Mesa Petroleum Co. a leading 
takeover raider). Letter to the writer dated 10 May 1985. 
This sentiment is echoed by Ivan Boesky a U.S. leading arbitrageur 
(The Evening Post 22/6/85) and R.A. Ross supra n.27D page 15. 
us 
• 
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If the target company can improve its share price a takeover of the 
target company will be more expensive, and perhaps uneconomical, for a 
raider. When attempting to obtain sellers of the target company's shares 
the raider is basically saying it can improve on the economic performance 
of the target company. 
The obvious way for a target company to increase its share price is to 
improve its economic performance and to inform the target company's 
shareholders and the market of this fact. (56) 
The target company may be able to increase its share price by the 
following: 
(i) Selling assets which are not integlal to the continuing 
"' profitability of the target company. Rationalising 
underperforming businesses. A raider will have no hesitation in 
undertaking such rationalisation. Rationalisation may include 
disposal of: non production real estate holdings, portfolio 
investments in other companies, businesses consistently generating 
earning below the target company rate of return on investment, 
luxurious head office premises and "orphans" that is businesses 
which bear little relevance to the mainstream activities of the 
target company. This frees up funds that may be used to give 
benefits to shareholders. 
(56) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 41. P. Mason supra n.27 page 4. 
"The problem vJith maximising performance in order to avoid a bid is that 
this may place greater emphasis on short-term strategies rather than 
long-term objective" - S. Higgs, W. Chant, and R. Halstead supra n.27C 
page 4. 
• 
• 
• 
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Monitoring the target company's gearing. If it is too low then it 
should be increased to enable the company to obtain extra funding 
for development or to give benefits to shareholders. Equity is 
the most expensive form of capital, the market may become flooded. 
Utilising tax losses. The value of tax losses is directly related 
to how quickly they can be absorbed.(56A) 
A target company's share price may also be affected by the target 
company's price earnings ratio ( 11 P/E ratio 11 ) (57)_ A company's P/E ratio 
vJi ll normally be higher the better its management is thought to be, the 
greater its growth prospects, the lower its financial risks, the greater 
the stability of its earnings.(58) 
(56A) R.A. Ross supra n.27D pages 9-11. 
(57) A P/E ratio gives a measure of the rate at which earnings are being 
capitalised. A P/E of 20 means that investors are willing to pay 20 
times current earning to purchase a share. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 
41. 
(58) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 41. 
• 
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0ne commentator<59) has suggested two ways of increasing a target 
company's P/E ratio: 
( i ) Separately floating off part of a target company's activities if 
the management of the target company believes such separate 
activity is likely to command a high P/E ratio. (60) 
(ii) Keeping the market well informed when it appears to be attaching 
too low a price to a target company. (61) 
The target company must realise that in certain circumstances a top share 
price in the stock exchange context may not be a deterent to a raider who 
seeks to takeover the target company for strategic reasons or because it 
is considering a different time horizon.(61A) 
If the Directors of a target company believe the target company's shares 
are at too low a price they may advise the market of their 
belief,(62) and may, to illustrate their confidence in that belief, state 
that the Directors intend to increase the number of shares in the target 
company they own.(63) 
(59) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 41. 
(60) The commentator illustrated this by stating that the price of Clabir 
Corporation, a U.S. conglomerate, more than doubled after it spun-off 33 
per cent of its subsidiary General Defence. 
(61) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 41. 
(61A) S. Higgs, W. Chant and R. Halstead supra n.27C page 3. 
(62) Recently illustrated by the newspaper clipping concerning Landmark 
(The Evening Post 26/6/85). The article alluded to the possibility that 
a raider may be interested in the shares of Landmark and may want to 
force the price down to make a takeover bid. 
(63) The writer believes this action was undertaken by the Directors of 
Fletcher Challenge Corporation Limited in late 1984 or early 1985. 
• 
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The writer believes informed shareholders are more likely to take 
cognizance of the Directors of the target company and their 
recommendations if a takeover bid occurs and comprehensive and reliable 
information given to shareholders is an essential strategy in today's 
information society.(63A) Credibility is critical; therefore frankness 
in disclosing bad as well as good news should be persued.(638) 
Articles of Association: 
3.31 Shark Repellants: 
The use of strategy to introduce measures to fend off a would-be 
raider, a shark, is in takeover jargon called "shark 
repellants 11 <64) 
(63A) See also the use of top advisors for information dissemination to 
interested parties (Paragraph 3.16 of this paper). P. Mason supra n.27 
page 4. Information to include well presented annual and interim reports 
and announcements from time to time of developments affecting the 
company. 
(638) R.A. Ross supra n.270 page 12. 
(64) TIME 4 March 1985 page 35 and TIME 6 February 1984 page 61. Roger S. 
Aaron "Corporate Acquisitions in the United States" Page 60. A paper 
presented in a seminar on Investment in the United States organised by 
the N.Z. Society of Accountants and the N.Z. Law Society held August 
1985. R.S. Aaron is a partner in the firm Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and 
Flom. C.G.G. Hogg supra n.6 page 121-122. The use of "shark repellants" 
has been criticised (eg see Article by Felix G. Rohatyn "Junk Bonds and 
Other Securities Swill II The Wa 11 Street Journal 18th April 1985) and the 
Tender Offer Reform Bill 1984 in USA if enacted would place severe 
restrictions on these defensive tactics. The Tender Offer Reform Bill 
1984 largely came about as a result of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission Advisory Committee Report of Recommendation on Tender Offers 
dated 8th July 1983. The Committee recommended the prohibition of shark 
repellant measures where they erect unduly high barriers to changes in 
corporate control (recommendation 35) and recommended to the extent that 
"shark repellants" were not prohibited that they be required to be 
ratified by shareholders every three years. 
• 
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There are "shark repellants" which involve the target's 
Articles of Association: 
A Classifed Board of Directors: 
A classified Board of Directors is divided into classes (usually 
three classes) which serve staggered terms. It is normal for this 
three year rotation term for Directors to be in a Company's 
Articles of Association. This structure in the United States 
attempts to make it more difficult to unseat the entire Board at 
once.(65) 
However, in New Zealand such a measure is virtually negated by the 
right of a person or persons holding 10% of a company to call an 
extraordinary general meeting of shareholders (66) and the fact 
that Directors may be removed by ordinary resolution of a company 
before the expiry of the Directors period of office, 
notwithstanding the Company's Articles of Association or any 
agreement between the Company and the Director.(67) 
(65) R.S. Aaron supra n.64 page 50; C.G.G. Hogg supra n.4 page 121; TIME - 6th 
February 1984 page 41; Sullivan and Cromwell supra n.270, page 28. 
(66) Section 136 of the Companies Act 1955. 
(67) Section 187 of the Companies Act 1955. 
• 
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A raider (if controlling or having the support of the majority of 
the target company) may remove directors (68) and appoint new 
directors to the target company's board, therefore enabling the 
raider to control the Board of Directors of the target 
company. ( 69) 
However, a classified Board of Directors can be effective if the 
target company has restricted voting rights (70) and the maximum 
number of Directors for the target company as stated in its 
Articles of Association does not allow many additional Directors 
to be appointed.(71) 
Section 187 of the Companies Act 1955 was threatened to be used by 
Equiticorp, the new minority (40%) shareholder of Feltex, to remove an 
existing Director of Feltex. (see The Dominion 7th May 1985, page 12). 
However procedural limitations (eg nomination requirements) may be 
implemented (see paragraph 3.3l(iv) of this paper). However see Plaza 
Security Co. v. O'Kelley, No. 7932 (Del.Ch. March 5 1985), aff'd No. 79, 
(Del. March 1985). A U.S. Court invalidatd a target company's Articles 
of Association that put substantial procedural limitations on the 
solicitation of shareholder consents to remove an incumbent Board of 
Directors. This information was obtained from a Memorandum by Fried, 
Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, a New York law firm headed "Tender 
Offer Defensive Tactics : A year of Change and Controversy" dated 11th 
April 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "Fried Frank Memorandum"). 
(70) For example, NZFP, any one shareholder has a nominal 15,000 share vote 
irrespective of the number of shares held. See paragraph 3.91 of this 
paper. 
(71) This assumes the raider has not the ability or support to remove 
directors under section 187 of the Companies Act 1955. In the BIL-Emco 
circumstances BIL nominated 5 additional Directors as Emco had 7 
directors and its Articles of Association allowed for a maximum of 12. 
(See The Dominion 7th May 1985 page 12). 
• 
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Supermajority Provisions: 
These are provisions in the Articles of Association that a merger 
or sale of substantially all of the company's assets or other 
transactions resulting in a change in corporate control must be 
approved by at least say 70% to 75% (a supermajority) of the 
shareholders of the target before it can take effect.(72) 
The writer knows of no New Zealand company having yet adopted 
supermajority provisions although there seems no present legal 
impediment to their adoption by a Company.(73) 
An example of a supermajority provision would be that, in the 
Articles of Association of the target company, there was an 
Article which allowed the Directors to refuse to register the 
transfer of shares to a proposed transferee if it was apparent 
that the shares of the company or any class thereof would be held 
or beneficially owned as to 50% or more by the transferee, except 
if such transfer is approved by the company in general meeting by 
a supermajority of 70% of those entitled to vote (excluding the 
transferee).(73A) 
(72) TIME - 4th March 1985 page 35; TIME - 6th February 1984 page 41; C.G.G. 
Hogg supra n.4 page 121; R.S. Aaron supra n.64 page 60; and Sullivan and 
Cromwell supra n.27D page 28. This is one of three defences that were 
the most popular anti-takeover measure adopted by U.S. companies during 
the fourth quarter of 1984 - Mergers and Acquisitions (Winter 1985) 
Volume 19 Number 4 R.92. See also J.C. Coffee Jr "Regulating The Market 
for Corporate Control : A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role . 
In Corporate Governance" (1984 )84 Columbia Law Review No. 5 page 
1262-1263 (US). 
(73) See however paragraph 3.91 of this paper a discussion of 11 loading 11 of 
voting rights by a target company in its Articles of Association. 
(73A) See paragraph 453(1) of the Stock Exchange Code which states Articles of 
Association of listed companies shall NOT provide for any restriction on 
the right to transfer any shares or for the Directors to have power to 
decline to register a transfer except in certain limited circumstances. 
The described Article would be in breach of paragraph 453(1) of the Stock 
Exchange code. 
• 
• 
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An alternative supermajority provision may be drafted such that 
the Directors may not sell substantially or all of the company's 
assets or issue a substantial number of shares for the purchase of 
businesses or cause the target company to enter into a transaction 
or series of transactions resulting in a change in corporate 
control unless a supermajority approval vote of shareholders is 
received. (738) 
(iii) Contingent Supermajority: "Fair-Price" Provisions: 
These are provisions in the Articles of Association that a merger 
or other business combination with a "significant shareholder" 
must be approved by a supermajority shareholder vote unless public 
shareholders receive a certain minimum price for their shares or 
approval to the merger or other business combination is obtained 
from the Directors of the target company.(73C) 
(738) This type of provision could be used by a listed company (in fact 
paragraph 448 of the Stock Exchange Code could be expanded) . 
(73C) Sullivan and Cromwell supra n.27D pages 28-29. This was another of the 
three defences (fair price, staggered Boards and supermajorities) that 
were the most popular anti-takeover measure adopted by U.S. companies 
during the fourth quarter of 1984 - Mergers and Acquisitions (Winter 
1985) Volume 19 Number 4 R.92 . 
• 
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This particular strategy in the U.S. has been developed to be an 
impediment to a "two-tiered" takeover offer followed by a 
"freeze-out merger" (730). A 11 two-ti ered 11 takeover offer is an 
offer which offers a higher price for the first percent of the 
target company's shares sold to the raider (the percent being 
normally that required to give the raider greater than 50% of 
control of the target company) and the balance of the shares 
sought (normally a further percent) are offered a lower purchase 
price. This II two-t i ered 11 takeover bid is designed to stampede 
sellers to sell their shares in the target company to the raider 
to receive the higher price whilst it is available. Once the 
raider has sufficient control of the target company it then seeks 
to implement a "freeze-out merger", whereby the raider is in 
control of the target company procures the target company's 
agreement to merg~ with the raider issuing shares for the 
purchase. The minority shareholders of the target company are 
"frozen-out of decision making". 
The \'lriter is unaware of: a 11 two-tiered 11 takeover offer being 
made, a blatantU3E) "freeze-out merger" taking place, or a target 
company adopting "fair-price" provisions, however there seems no 
present legal impediment to any of the above taking place.(73F) 
(730) Sullivan and Cromwell supra n.27D page 29 . 
(73E) The writer believes this type of merger takes place, especially 
undertaken by unlisted company's which takes over a listed company and 
then procures that the unlisted company is merged or its businesses are 
purchased by the listed company ("back-door listing") . 
(73F) Depending on the exact drafting of the "fair price" provision (see n.73A 
and n.738) such provision may or may not be available to a listed target 
company governed by the Stock Exchange Code . 
• 
• 
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Nominating/Removal Directors Procedures: 
A target company may adopt provisions in its Articles of 
Association that provide for a complicated and II early warning" 
system for the nomination of persons to be Directors of the target 
company. Such provisions would prevent "surprise nominations" at 
annual general meetings.(73G) 
Such provisions are of limited effect having regard to the ability 
of a shareholder, controlling or having the support of the holders 
of in excess of 50 percent of the voting capital of the target 
company, to remove the entire Board of Directors utilising Section 
187 of the Companies Act 1955.(73H) 
(73G) Sulllivan and Cromwell supra n.27D pages 31-32 . 
(73H) Section 187 of the Companies Act 1955. Restrictions may be placed on 
filling a casual vacancy (see however Fitzgerald v. Association 
Motorists' Petrol Co. Ltd [1936JNZLR 390 and Munster v. Cammell Co . 
(1882)21 Ch.D 183. See Plaza Security Co. v. 0 1 Kelley No. 7932 (Del. Ch. 
March 1985), aff 1 d, No. 79 (Del. March 1985). A US Court invalidated a 
target company's Articles of Association that put substantial procedural 
limitations on the solicitation of shareholder consents to remove an 
incumbent Board of Directors (Information from Fried Frank Memorandum 
supra n.69). 
• 
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A target company may adopt provisions in its Articles of 
Association that provide that, in the event of an ordinary 
resolution being proposed at a general meeting of the target 
company for the removal of a director, any shares held by that 
Director should carry weighted voting rights.(73I) 
Overseas Ownership Restricted: 
A target company may adopt provisions in its Articles of 
Association that enable the Directors of the target company to 
refuse to register transfers in favour of 11 overseas persons 11 and, 
in some cases, to compel a transfer of shares by an overseas 
person.(73J) This can be justified if the Directors of the 
target company reasonably be lieve the emergence of an 11 overseas 
person 11 as a shareholder or the target company becoming an 
11 overseas person 11 would pr ej udi ce the target company in its 
business operations.(73K) 
(73I) Bushell v. Faith [1970JA.C. 1099. 
D. Gonski and P. Kennan supra n.26A page 25. 
(73J) D. Gonski and P. Keenan supra n.26A page 22. A recent example of an 
Australian company adopting such a provision is The Myer Emporium 
Limited. See paragraph 453(l)(d) of the Stock Exchange Code. The 
adoption of Articles along these lines is common in New Zealand and wa s 
made reference to recently by the Chairman for CPD when a mystery, 
perhaps overseas raider was a possibility (Evening Post 6/8/85 page 21). 
(73K) D. Gonski and P. Keenan supra n.26A page 23. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Disclosure of Beneficial Interest of Shareholding: 
As a raider of a target company may build up a shareholding in the 
target company by using nominees, the target company should 
consider ensuring that its Articles of Association requires a 
nominee to disclose who the beneficial owner of shares held is and 
failure to disclose such information disenfranchises the nominee 
from voting on the target company's affairs.(74) 
Employment Contracts (Two further shark repellants): 
Two further "shark repellants 11 involve types of employment contract with 
the management of the target company. 
(74) L. Goodman - supra n.28 page 186. 
The writer believes the Stock Exchange Code (paragraph 428) does not 
preclude such a provision in the Articles of Association of a company 
listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
Paragraph 428 states: 
11 Every member being entitled to vote under the provisions of the 
Articles of Association shall be entitled in respect of those 
shares on which no call is in arrears: 
( a) 
( b) 
On a show of hands, to one vote; 
On a poll, to one vote for eac h unit of capital reduced to 
a common demoni nator (Emphasis added by the writer). 
The Chairman of the Securities Commission, C. I . Pa t terson (supra n.3 page 
29), has indicated that the Securities Commission recommended that the 
law be amended so that disclosure of beneficial ownership should be 
required when a nominee shareholder attains 5% of the issued shares of a 
company. This recommendation has yet to be enacted into legislation. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Golden Parachutes/Silver Wheelchairs(74A): 
These are contracts made by the target company with key executives 
(including directors) where the key executives receive a 
substantial payment of some kind if they lose their jobs as a 
result of a change in corporate contro1.(75) 
In New Zealand approval by a company in general meeting is 
required for payments to be made to a Director for loss of 
office. (75A) The writer does not know of any 11 golden parachutes 11 
issued by New Zealand companies. 
3.42 General Service Contracts: 
Key management (including directors) of the target company may be 
given long-term service contracts. Such long-term service 
contracts may have the effect of discouraging a takeover since it 
complicates the removal of such key management.(76) Breaching the 
contracts costs the raider and the benefit is to the key personnel 
of the target company. 
(74A) 11 Silver Wheelchairs 11 was an expression used by Peter Dodd when presenting 
his paper 11 The Financial Economics View of Regulation of Mergers & 
Takeovers 11 supra n.3. 
(75) TIME - 4th March page 61; C.G.G. Hogg supra n.4 page 122; R.S. Aaron 
supra n.64 page 60; J.C. Coffee Jnr supra n.72 pages 1262-1264 . 
(75A) 
(76) 
11 Such agreements, which are now a standard part of many top-level 
employment contracts, ensure corporate officers that they will be paid 
off if the company that buys their firm fires them or reduces their 
power. These bonuses can reach $10 million for the chairman of a larger 
company 11 - TIME 4 March 1985 page 35. 
However the Tax Reform Act 1984 in the U.S. has affected the 
attractiveness of 11 golden parachutes 11 in the U.S. F.B. Weil and R.W . 
Wood II New Taxes Tami sh Luster of Golden Parachutes 11 (Winter 1985) 19 
Mergers and Acquisitions 4 page 54. 
See Sections 191 to 194 of the Companies Act 1955 . 
R.S. Aaron - supra n.64 page 61; C.G.G. Hogg supra n.4 page 122; C.W. 
Forbes supra n.24 Chapter 2. 
• 
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11 There is nothing inherently objectionable in a company's execution of a 
long term service contract with a director in order to retain his 
services. 11 (?7) 
However service contracts with the Directors of a target company will be 
invalid if they are: 
(i) Not entered into in the best interests of the company; or 
(ii) entered into specifically for the purposes of preventing a 
takeover bid.(78) 
The Companies Act 1955 does require some disclosure in the accounts to be 
laid before every company in general meeting of the amount of 
remuneration received by the Directors for their services during the 
Company's financial year.(79) 
(77) The Securities Commission Report supra n.6 para 5.6.1. 
(78) .!:!Qg_g_ v. Cramphorn supra n.27. See Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 para 
2447 - Also if the Directors do act with such an improper purpose it may 
be validated by obtaining the approval of the shareholders in general 
meetings so long as the Directors believed the service contracts were in 
the best interests of the company (it is desirable for the Directors 
concerned not to vote at the general meeting). 
(79) Section 197 of the Companies Act 1955. See also Section 196 of the 
Companies Act 1955). 
Section 26 of the Companies Act 1967 (U.K.) requires that a copy of every 
directors service contract must be available for inspection by members at 
the Company's registered office, unless the contracts expire within one 
year or are determinable within one year without the payment of 
compensation. 
• 
• 
• 
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In the United Kingdom under their Companies Act directors service 
contracts for periods longer than five years are invalid unless approved 
by the Company in general meeting.(79) The writer understands therefore 
that such service contracts are automatically extended for the full five 
year term at the end of each day, therefore whenever a takeover is made 
and concluded there will be a five year term to be completed, or to be 
compensated for if the contract is breached.(80) 
To the writer's knowledge service agreements are presently not commonly 
undertaken as a defence to a takeover, and any long term agreement (over 
5 years) has a tendancy to be seen as blatantly self-serving.(81) 
(79) Section 47 of the Companies Act 1980 . 
(80) Discussion Mark Bucknill, a lecturer at the Victoria University, 
Wellington. 
(81) C.W. Forbes supra n.24 page 41 . 
• 
• 
• 
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3.50 Voting Agreements between Shareholders 
(82) 
One of the simplest defence strategies is for two or more shareholders, 
each holding insufficient shares to secure effective control, to enter 
into an agreement in terms of which their joint holdings are to be voted 
as a block and may not be sold separately.(82) 
Large shareholders may be given seats on the Board of Directors thereby 
hoping to tie their loyalty to the present management.(83) 
It may involve two companies having interlocking shareholding, however 
not necessarily.(84) 
Such voting agreements may state that decisions as to the sale of the 
shares which are subject to the agreement, or the exercise of voting 
rights, must be made unanimously (with arbitration in the event of a 
conflict) or perhaps by majority of the shareholders in number or in 
value of the shares contributed.(85) 
Weinberg and Blank supra para 2404, S. Lofthouse supra page 43, and A. 
Vrisakis and G. Samuel supra n.33 page 7. However parties to a voting 
agreement may fall out - see for a description of such problems 
Greenhalgh v. Ardene Cinemas [1946]1 ALL E.R. 512 (C.A.). 
(83) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43. 
(84) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43 . 
(85) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 para 2404 . 
• 
• 
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It is likely such voting agreements are entered into in collaboration 
with or with the co-operation of the Directors of the target company 
because if two or more shareholders wish to exercise effective control of 
a company they must do it through the Directors, and therefore the 
Directors must either be people whose appointment they have secured or 
the existing Directors of whose policies they approve. (86) 
Clearly two shareholders acting pursuant to such voting agreement would 
normally be regarded as 11 in concert 11 (87) in terms of the Stock Exchange 
code. (88 ) 
(86) Weinberg and Black supra n.27 para 2404. 
(87) See paragraph 613(4) of the Stock Exchange Code which states 11 Persons 
acting in concert include those who, pursuant to an agreement or 
understanding, whether formal or not, actively co-operate through the 
acquisition by any of them of shares in a company to obtain or 
consolidate control of the company. 11 
(88) In the United Kingdom because they have a mandatory offer requirement 
under their Stock Exchange code (if over 30% of the target is acquired), 
then a person or persons acting in concert are required to make a general 
offer to all shareholders and therefore if further shares are purchased 
after concluding a voting agreement a mandatory offer may be required to 
be made - See Weinberg and Black supra n.27 para 2404 . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-43-
The most publically known voting agreements are between the companies 
Wattie Industries Limited, ( 11 Wattie 11 ), Goodman Group Limited 
(
11 Goodman 11 ) and New Zealand Forest Products Limited ( 11 NZFP 11 ) • 
There are two agreements, one between Goodman and NZFP and one between 
Wattie and NZFP.(89) 
The overall effect of the agreements is as follows:(90) 
(a) Wattie: 
( i ) Goodman will not hold more than 35% of Wattie. 
(ii) NZFP will not hold more than 24.9% of Wattie. 
(iii) NZFP will vote its shareholding in accordance with the 
recommendations of Wattie Directors at general meetings of 
Wattie. 
(iv) NZFP has the right to appoint two directors to the Wattie 
Board. 
(89) The Commerce Commission Decision (dated 29th May 1985) 114A. This 
decision dealt with the purchase of shares in Dominion Industries Limited 
by Wattie Industries Limited sets out the basic terms of the Agreements . 
The Commerce Commission have refused a request under the Official 
Information Act 1982 by letter dated 17th June 1985 to disclose copies of 
the agreements on the ground that the agreements were supplied in 
confidence to the Commission and disclosure would prejudice the supply 
of similar information in future. 
(90) The Commerce Commission Decision (dated 29th May 1985) 114A . 
• 
• 
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(b) Goodman: 
(c) 
(i) Wattie will hold not more than 35% of Goodman . 
( i i ) NZFP will not hold any shares in Goodman. 
(iii) Wattie will vote in accordance with the recommendations of 
Goodman Directors at general meeting of Goodman . 
NZFP: 
(i) Watti e ma intain but will not hold more than 24.9% of NZFP. 
(ii) Goodman wi ll have no holding of shares in NZFP • 
(iii) Watti e wi ll vote in accordance with recommendations of NZFP 
directors at general meetings of NZFP. 
(iv) Wattie has the right to appoint two directors to the NZFP 
Board . 
• 
• 
• 
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3.60 Interlocking Shareholdings Between the Target Company and another Company 
or Companies ("Wheels 11 )(90A) 
Although a company may not, except in certain cases, acquire shares in 
its holding company (91) there is nothing to prevent two or more 
companies from acquiring and holding large - but not over fifty (50) per 
cent - blocks of shares in each other (92), although holdings exceeding 5 
per cent of a company may have to be disclosed to the Stock 
Exchange.(93) 
Such interlocking shareholders are generally announced to have the 
purpose of "forging a solid financial link. 11 (94) 
(90A) P. Mason supra n.27 page 5. 
(91) Section 40 of the Companies Act 1955. And section 40 states any 
allotment or transfer of shares in a company to its subsidiary shall be 
void. 
(92) Section 40 of the Companies Act 1955. See section 158 of the Companies 
Act 1955 for the meaning of "holding company" and "subsidiary". 
(93) Paragraph 509(3) of the Stock Exchange Code, which states: 
(94) 
"A listed company upon disposing of or acquiring, by whatever 
means, a beneficial interest in 5% or more of the issued shares of 
another listed company, is to advise the Exchange Immediately by 
telecommunication 11 
Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 para 2406. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
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11 Where ... three companies (with a common board of directors or 
with boards which agree to act in concert) each have a holding of 
26 per cent of the ordinary voting shares of each of the other 
companies .•. , the board of directors of each company, with the 
assistance of the boards of the other companies, command a 
majority and therefore cannot be removed by the remaining 
shareholders. A similar situation arises in practice where two or 
more companies have substantial cross-holdings in each other even 
though these provide something less than a majority. Then there 
is so-called 'circular ownership': company A holds 40 per cent of 
the ordinary voting shares of company B, which holds 40 per cent 
of the ordinary voting shares of company C, which in turn holds 40 
per cent of the ordinary voting shares of company A. The 
directors of all three companies, if they act in concert, can in 
practice prevent the removal of any of them by the other 
shareholders. 11 (95) 
One further, somewhat blatant, method is for a company to sell part of 
its undertaking to a separate company, distribute 51 per cent of the 
shares in the separate company to its own shareholders and cause the 
separate company to purchase shares in the company.(96) 
Paragraph 152 of the Report of the Jenkins Committee, Cmnd 1749 (U.K.). 
(96) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 para 2406 . 
• 
• 
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A form of reciprocal shareholding is called 1 pyramiding 1 which can be 
illustrated as follows: 
11 A. holds 51 per cent of the shares of A. Co. B. holds 51 per 
cent of the shares of B. Co. They agree to form a new company, 
A. & B. Holdings, to take over their shares in A. Co. and B. Co., 
and enter into a voting agreement in respect of their shareholding 
in the new company. After the new company is formed, they sell 49 
per cent of its shares to the public. In this way, while getting 
49 per cent of their investment out in cash they retain voting 
control of both A. Co. and B. Co. 11 (97) 
Also a system ( 11 pyramiding 11 ) used by United Kingdom mining houses and 
investment groups is where a group of small individual holdings 
(individual holding less than 10% but collectively between 15 percent and 
50 percent) when held through a series of inter-related companies, all 
ultimately under the same management control, can confer effective 
control in a company where the shares are otherwise widely dispersed, 
geographically as well as regards numbers of shareholders. (98) The 
system can be effective because a comparatively low individual 
shareholding in a company, where other shareholders tend to be apathetic 
or do not combine together, and this can give a single group of people 
management control of that company; a small holding by that company in 
another company can again be sufficient to allow the same group to 
acquire management control of the second company, and so the control of a 
single management group can be established through a wide range of 
companies.(99) 
Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 para 2408. 
(98) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 para 2409 . 
(99) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 para 2409. 
• 
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A similar and even more simplistic, method is for two companies to 
acquire a large shareholding in each other.(100) This method has been 
utilised by Goodman and Wattie for some years, now joined by NZFP in a 
triangular shareholding.(101) 
Recently Cable Price Downer Corporation Limited ( 11 CPD 11 ) and Crown 
Corporation Limited ("Crown") obtained the necessary consent of the 
Examiner of Trade Practices to buy a 50% shareholding in each other, 
previously in 1984 Crown acquired a 24.7% shareholding in Crown while 
Crown took up 20% of CPD. 
"The 50% potential shareholding provides both companies with 
immediate ability to defend the other's share capital in the event 
of a market raid." (102) 
This type, and especially this magnitude, of cross shareholding raises 
the question OF whether this is in the best interests of the shareholders 
of each company.(103) The Chairman of the Securities Commission, Mr 
Colin Paterson has been reported as stating: 
(100) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 83. 
It seems the South African mining houses are the leading proponents of 
this method. 
(101) See for background from an accounting viewpoint - A. J. D. Moore II A Study 
in Cross Holdings" (1985) The Accountants' Journal February 1985 page 64 . 
(102) Linda Sanders in The Dominion 29/5/85. 
(103) Peter O'Brien supra page 19. It may also cause accounting problems. 
(The Dominion 16/5/85 - Article by Linda Sanders.) 
• 
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11 I am inclined to go further and suggest that where there are 
cross-shareholdings by one group of companies in another, the 
voting rights should be in abeyance in respect of each holding. 
This would be consistent with the reduction of capital theory ... 
with reference to equity accounting." (104) 
Also there is the danger that: 
( i ) the "friendly" shareholder (if there is no reciprocal 
shareholding) turns raider(l05) or; 
(ii) the "friendly shareholder is sought by a raider as a vehicle for 
obtaining the target(l06) . 
Therefore some criteria in selecting the "friendly" shareholder include: 
( a) 
( b) 
Compatibility with the target company's Board of Directors and 
management. 
Assurance of resistance to offers for its shareholdings. 
(104) The Evening Post 15 March 1985. 
(105) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42 . 
(106) An example was the proposed takeover by Robert Holmes A'Court of Asarco 
Inc. It was believed that Mr A'Court was interested in Asarco Inc. 
because it owned more than 40% of the Australia company MIM . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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(c) An inability to acquire control of the target company 
itself. (106A) 
( d) Relative invulnerability to takeover itself either because it is 
hopefully too big or it has a stable majority shareholder.(1068) 
It is generally preferable for the friendly shareholder to acquire his 
shareholding by share market purchases. Placements can upset existing 
large shareholders and means the target company's Board of Directors has 
put a price on the shares.(106C) 
(106A) See paragraph 4.12 of this paper "standstill" Agreements. 
(1068) A. Vrisakis and G. Samuel supra n.33 page 5 . 
(106C) A. Vrisakis and G. Samuel supra n.33 page 5 and discussion on the paper . 
• 
• 
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3.70 Issue of Shares to 11 Friendly 11 Party0060): 
This strategy is similar to interlocking shareholding but there is no 
cross shareholding.(107) 
A number of situations can exist including: 
3. 71 Employees: 
The issue of shares to employees is seen as furthering an 
employees' stake in the target company's development.(108) 
The Directors of the target company hope£ the employees will be 
sympathetic to the Directors of the target company and not welcome 
a takeover (especially if restructuring and retrenchment is 
possible).009) 
Such issues are commonly carried out by possible target companies, 
however such issues must not be made purely to thwart a takeover 
bid,(110) 
(1060) Caution is required. Robert Holmes a Court (Australian takeover 
businessman) has shown that the Australian company MIM is vulnerable 
through the U.S. company Asarco which owns 44% of MIM. P. Mason supra 
n.27 page 5. 
(107) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2412 . 
(108) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2412. P. Mason supra n.27 page 6. 
(109) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2412. P. Mason supra n.27 page 6 . 
(110) ..ti2.9.9_ v. Cramphorn supra n.27 
• 
• 
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3.72 Employee Superannuation Funds: 
An employee superannuation fund investing in shares of the target 
company is also furthering the interest of employeeis in the 
target company.(llOA) 
The trustees of the Company's superannuation fund are generally 
either employees of the Company or persons appointed by the 
Directors and will generally be receptive to the wishes of the 
Directors of the Target company.(111) 
However the trustees, like all trustees, do have very special 
obligations so that the Directors may not be able to rely on their 
support in all instances(ll2), especially if the offer bid is 
generous. ( l12A) 
3.72 Close Business Associate: 
A target company may issue shares to a close business associate, 
the rationale being to further their close business 
• association.(113) 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
(llOA) There are certain limitations on the extent the fund can be exposed to 
its company's Securities (Superannuation Schemes Regulations 1983, 
Regulations 10(4) and 10(5)) and listed target companies also should be 
aware of paragraph 425(i)(a)(ii) of the Stock Exchange Code . 
(111) 
(112) 
Weinberg and Blank supra paragraph 2412 and P. Mason supra n.27 page 6. 
See also A.G. Brecher, S. Lazarus III, and W.A. Gray "The Function of 
Emp 1 oyee Retirement Plans as an Impediment to Takeovers" (1983) Vo 1 ume 38 
The Business Lawyer (US) page 503. 
Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2414. 
(112A) A. Vrisakis and G. Samuel supra n.33 discussion on paper. 
(113) For example the placement by Arnotts Limited of 6.1 per cent of its 
capital to Campbell Soup Company Inc. (The Dominion 10.4.85). Arnotts 
Limited, an Australian company, was under takeover threat and found a 
"friendly" party in the American company Campbell Soup Company Inc. 
{ 
• 
• 
• 
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3.73 Vendor: 
A target company may issue shares in consideration for the target 
company purchasing an asset or another company. The Directors may 
believe the new shareholders are 11 friendly 11 .014) 
(114) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2420. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 
48. 
See also Gearhart Industries Inc. v. Smith International Inc., 741 F.2d 
707 (5th Cir. 1984). Gearhart Industries Inc. ( 11 Gearhart 11 ) shareholders 
had received a tender offer from Smith International Inc. ( 11 Smith 11 ). 
While Smith's tender offer was pending, but after it has been enjoined by 
the district court for securities law violations, Gearhart agreed with 
Aetna Life & Casulty Company ( 11 Aetna 11 ) to buy an Aetna subsidiary in 
exchange for shares in Gearhart. The United States Fifth Circuit on 
appeal refused to stop the purchase by Gearhart but instead remanded the 
case for factual determinations and set out what issues were to be 
examined. 
11 It may be that Smith can present sufficient evidence to convi nee 
the Court that Gearhart directors who entered into the Geosource 
[Aetna's subsidiary] deal were interested, given circumstances 
such as the eight-day time span from contract to closing, the fact 
that Gearhart was in the throes of battle for control of the 
company at that time, and the retention in Gearhart management of 
voting control of all the new shares, a provision we think is 
particularly suspicious. If Smith can make its case for interested 
directors, then the burden is on Gearhart to convince the Court 
that the Geosource acquisition is fair to the Corporation." (page 
76). 
The District court never heard the case on remand because Gearhart and 
Smith reached a settlement agreement. (Information from Fried Frank 
Memorandum supra n.69). 
·1,, ~ , 
<: 
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3.74 Overseas Shareholders: 
An overseas shareholder who is 11 friendly 11 to the target company 
may be ideal in that the overseas shareholder can only obtain up 
to 25% of the target company without getting the necessary consent 
of the Overseas Investment Commission.(114A) 
Defensive Merger (11 White Knight") 
A target company, fearing a takeover by a raider, may decide to undertake 
a defensive merger.(115) 
(114A) Regulation 7 of the Overseas Investment Regulations 1974. The writer 
believes consent required by the Overseas Investment Commission is 
presently normally no certain protection to a target company from the 
''friendly" overseas company becoming 11 hostile 11 in light of the relaxed 
Commission and Government attitude to overseas investment in New Zealand. 
However it worked for AHI and ACI (see footnote 262). This may be more 
relevant for Australian target companies - P. Mason supra n.27 page 5 . 
(115 ) Wanvig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 663-487 (Wins. Cir, Ct. March 29 
1985 ). The Wisconsin Court held t hat the Directors of Johnson Controls 
Inc . in the face of a possible takeover threat had not breached their 
fudic iary duty in planning a merger with Hoover Universal Inc. without a 
shareho lders vote, because no shareholder vote was required under 
Wisc on sin Corporation law and the plaintiffs failed to show that 
t hwarting the raider was the sole reason for the merger. (Information 
f rom Fried Frank Memorandum supra n.69.) 
• 
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Such a defensive merger with a private third party company may involve: 
(i) Swapping some shares in the target company for all the shares of 
the third party company.(116) This enables the shares of the 
target company swapped to be held by 11 friendly 11 shareholders. (117) 
The management of the target company to ensure such "friendly" 
shareholders may arrange for a voting agreement to be entered into 
between the existing and new 11 friendly 11 shareholders in relation 
to the affairs of the Company and the target company's reaction in 
the event that a takeover attempt is made for the target company 
( as merged). (118) 
(ii) The target company purchases another company for cash. (119) Such 
a move would be particularly attractive to a target company "cash 
ri eh". (120) 
(116) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422. See paragraph 425 of the 
Stock Exchange Code for listed target companies. This paragraph sets 
certain restrictions on a listed company issuing share capital. 
(117) A decision for such share swap may be questioned but it is unlikely that 
the Court will question the decision to share swap if management's 
decision was bona fide arrived at. Howard Smith Limited v. Ampol 
Petroleum and Others supra n.27 S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42 . 
(118) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422. 
(119) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 
page 42. 
(120) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 
page. 42 
• 
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A target company may become "cash rich" for many reasons (for example by 
the sale of part of a company's business (121) or an investment 
shareholding (122)). 
Decreasing the target company's "cash rich" position means the target 
company is less attractive to a potential raider.(123) 
(121) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422 . 
(122) It is the writers belief that ACI in Australia would be seen as "cash 
rich" if ACI agreed to sell its shareholding in AHI to Carter Holt. 
(123) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 
page 42. 
• 
• 
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Defensive mergers may deter a possible raider by reason of: 
(a) Diversification caused by the merger may be unacceptable to the 
raider. (126) 
(b) The enlarged size of the target may cause factors under the 
Commerce Act 1975 to be relevant. (127) 
A target company may al so search for a "white kni ght 11 • A 11 whi te kni ght 11 
is a company that rides to the aid of a target company in a takeover 
fight. The knight rescues the target company be agreeing to purchase it, 
or a significant part of it(l28), on better terms than the raider would 
provide. The better terms may include a higher purchase price for the 
shares in the target company and assurances that the management of the 
(126) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422. 
(127) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2422. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 
page 42. 
(128) For example Steel and Tube Limited rescuing Emco from BIL (The Dominion 
and Evening Post 6/7/85) . 
For such a merger that went wrong see Smith v. Van Gorkom No. 255, 1982 
(Del. Jan 29 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, found 
the Trans Union Corporation board of directors personally liable because 
it had acted grossly negligent in that failed to act with informed 
reasonable deliberation in agreeing to a $US690 million merger proposal 
by the Morman Group. The case has been strongly criticized, however, 
because there was no claim of fraud or improper motive. (Information 
from Fried Frank Memorandum supra n.69). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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target company will not be fired or retrenched.(129) A target company 
may keep a list of potential white knights,(130) however approaching 
companies to act as "white knights" before a takeover bid appears in fact 
to precipitate takeover bids (a potential raider may be galvanised into 
action by the "white knight" rumour and once the Directors have indicated 
that they are prepared to merge the target company's directors may find 
it difficult to refuse a better offer from a raider).(131) 
(129) TIME 4 March 1985 page 35. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43. 
(130) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42 . 
(131) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 242i. 
L. Goodman supra n.28 page 187. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
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However use of a 11 white knight 11 for a target may cause problems. If the 
11 white knight 11 does not research the role it is expected to play in the 
target company before indicating its intention to play such a role the 
11 white knight 11 may, when a takeover bid is made, decide to undertake a 
proper appraisal of the target company and delay in making such 
assessment may enable the raider to takeover the target 
company.(132) Alternatively, the white knight may not wish to be involved 
in a contested takeover battle or may simply lose interest in saving the 
target company.(133) 
Also the use of a 11 white knight 11 may not always work for the target 
company in that the merged company may not be successful (therefore 
itself being vulnerable to a takeover). Although intended to save the 
jobs of the management of the target company on many occasions once the 
white knight has learned the ropes of the target company it employs its 
own people. (134) 
(132) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42 . 
(133) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42. 
(134) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42. 
The ultimate 11 white knight 11 strategy going wrong was in the United 
States where Bendix Corporation made a takeover attempt of Martin 
Marietta Corporation. Martin Marietta Corporation and United 
Technologies Corporation retaliated by making a takeover attempt on 
Bendix. Bendix believed it was losing the battle and linked up with a 
11 white knight 11 Allied Corporation. The top management of Bendix 
eventually lost their positions in Bendix. (NEWSWEEK 4 October 1982). 
For a detailed description of this takeover battle see A. Sloan Three --
Plus One Equals Billions (Arbor House, New York, 1983) . 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
3.90 
-60-
Capital Reconstruction ("Poison Pills 11 )035) 
3.91 Non-voting, Restricted or Weighted Voting Rights: 
New Zealand target companies may create shares with non-voting, 
restricted or weighted voting rights.(136) 
Such shares with non-voting, restricted or weighted rights must be 
issued in accordance with the target company's Articles of 
Association. This was confirmed in the case of~ v. Cramphorn 
Limited (137) where Buckley J. held: 
( i ) That since the Articles of Association state that every 
share was entitled to one vote only, the Directors did not 
have the power to issue new shares with ten votes, 
notwithstanding that there were Articles which stated that 
the shares of the particular company were under the control 
of the Directors who may allot or otherwise dispose of 
shares on such terms and conditions as the Directors think 
fit and that new shares shall be issued upon such terms and 
conditions, and with such rights and priviledges attached 
to such new shares as the Directors determine and with a 
special or without any right of voting. 
(135) Poison Pill - a defense that makes the takeover so expensive or 
unattractive that the raider gives up the quest - TIME 4/3/85 . 
(136) For example NZFP's Articles of Association limit$ the vote of any one 
shareholder (no matter how many shares held) to a nominal 15,000 share 
vote (The Dominion 30/5/85). See however paragraph 428 of the Stock 
Exchange code set out in n.74 previously and the previous discussion on 
Classified Board of Directors in paragraph 3.3l(i) of this paper. See 
J.C. Coffee Jr. supra n.72 page 1263. See Bushell v. Faith supra n.73I. 
(137) [1967]1 Ch. 254. 
• 
• 
• • 
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that, the power to issue shares was a fiduciary power, and 
if exercised for the purpose of forstalling a takeover bid, 
then such issue of new shares was invalid in the absence of 
a resolution of the Company in general meeting ratifying 
it.(138) 
Some large United Kingdom companies have utilised the technique of 
issuing shares carrying no votes or restricted voting rights in exchange 
for acquisitions and by way of capitalisation issues.(139) 
(138) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2426 . 
(139) This enables the controlling shareholders to realise part of their 
shareholdings without reducing their proportion of voting power held by 
them. 
Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2427 footnote 66. 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
-62-
It is believed that the issue of shares with non-voting or 
restricted rights, although allowable, is exceptionable because of 
institutional and investor resistance and dissatisfaction with a 
company issuing such shares.(140) 
It is proposed that companies listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange will be obliged to have Articles of Association which 
allow every shareholder entitled to vote, on a poll, to one vote 
for each share by the time of the next general review of the Stock 
Exchange Code in 1986. (141) 
(140) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2435. See also paragraphs 
2428-2434 (inclusive) which discusses the arguments for and against 
legislation prohibiting or abolishing non-voting shares. 
(141) Letter from the New Zealand Stock Exchange to members dated 12th July 
1985 noting amendments to the Code effective 1 July 1985 . 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• 
• • 
3.92 
-63-
Issue of Convertible Securities: 
Loan Stock: 
Companies often issue loan stock which is convertible into equity 
share capital or which carries the right to subscribe for equity 
share capital. 042) 
Such loan stock is normally issued primarily to raise capital 
relatively inexpensively(l43), however it may have the purpose of 
being either a useful form of consideration to offer in a takeover 
bid or making the target company less attractive to a potential 
raider. 0 44 ) 
(142) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2425. A. Vrisakis and G. Samuel 
supra n.33 see such securities as a target company 11 confusing the share 
structure 11 (page 4). 
(143) 
(144) 
The interest paid may be deductible by the target company - Section 194 
of the Income Tax Act 1976 as opposed to dividend payments which are not 
deductible. 
Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2425. 
\ 
\ I 
.. . 
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Terms may be inserted in the loan stock, whether convertible or 
not, such that repayment is required at par or at a premium on the 
completion of a takeover.(145) 
A target company may issue loan stock with a low issue price being 
substantially discounted from the par value, however with a 
provision for repayment at par on a takeover, therefore the worth 
of the target company is less to a raider than to the existing 
shareholders. (146) 
(145) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2438. See also Gearhart 
Industries Inc. v. Smith International Inc., n.114 Gearhart Industries 
Inc issued debt securities convertable to equity upon the occuren t of a 
tender offer. Such issue was challenged but was upheld in the Court, no 
evidence of self-interest was established on the part of Gearhart 
Directors and the transaction was fair to the Corporation. Evidence of 
fairness included: 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i i ) 
(iv) 
(v) 
respected financial and investment banking counsel was retained; 
the transaction was approved before Smith International Inc's 
tender offer; 
the yield on the debt securities was reasonable at the time; 
the conversion agreement was an integral part of the offering 
because it helped alleviate uncertainty as to Gearhart's future 
and the conversion lent flexibility to the investors and allowed 
Gearhart to convert debt to equity; 
the exercise price of conversion, approximated the market price of 
Gearhart stock before Smith International Inc. 's buying commenced; 
(vi) credible business reasons for issuing debt were found, such as to 
retire old debt and raise new capital; and 
(vii) arms lengths bargaining between sophisticated businessmen had 
occured. 
(Information from Fried Frank Memorandum supra n.69) . 
(146) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 parargraph 2438. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 
page 43. 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
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Also loan stock convertible to shares upon a takeover add to a 
raider's problem as the amount of equity to be acquired could be 
considerably expanded.(147) 
3.93 Options for Shares: 
(i) To Third Parties (Example of a "poison pill") 
The issue by a target company of an option or options for 
shares has recently been utilised by Waitaki - NZR Limited 
("Waitaki") when BIL made a bid for 15% of the shares of 
Waitaki. 
Waitaki Directors, in response to the partial takeover, 
announced Waitaki was issuing an option for 20 per cent of 
the capital of Waitaki to an unnamed third party at an 
undisclosed cost in accordance with its Articles of 
Association. (148) This would force BIL to buy extra 
shares if BIL wished to obtain its 15 per cent 
shareholding. (149) 
Shortly after the announcement The New Zealand Stock 
Exchange countered by suspending Waitaki shares "pending 
clarification of certain aspects of the 
announcement. 11 (150) 
(147) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2438. 
(148) Evening Post 16/4/85. 
(149) 
(150) 
The Waitaki Directors also repeated their "don't sell" recommendations in 
response to the BIL "stand in the market" and stated reasons for their 
belief that l BIL move was not in the best interests of Waitaki shareholders. 
Evening Post 16/4/85. 
Additional cost of $6 million at then current prices. 
The Dominion 20/4/85. 
• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
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The Stock Exchange Code states that a company must not 
issue shares that will effectively change control (151) of 
a company without express shareholder approva1.(152) 
One commentator stated that the option issue by Waitaki was 
criticised as "an effective major dilution of capital, as 
it is assumed the options will convert to ordinary shares 
at some time". (153) 
It was reported that BIL management: 
(i) was considering action in the High Court to resolve 
what it considers an "absurd and rediculous 11 
defensive move; (154) 
(ii) stated "this thing [the option] bypasses all the 
genuine Waitaki shareholders, who now find that 
their company is delisted because of this action". 
(155) 
(151) Effective control is regarded as possibly being affected by an issue in 
which any one beneficial interest acquires 10% or more of the voting 
capital of the company (paragraph 311(4) of the Stock Exchange Code). 
See N.L. Scheinkestel "Control - Hov, to Regulate an Elusive Concept" 
2(1984) Company and Securities Law Journal No.4 page 251 (Aust). 
(152) Paragraph 311 of the Stock Exchange Code. 
(153) The Dominion 20/4/85 
(154) Ibid. 
(155) Ibid. 
• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
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"From the company's [Waitaki 's] point of view it was an 
exce119t defensive move. While the Stock Exchange 
expressed its displeasure and suspended quotation of the 
shares (and flushed out who the shares were being issued to 
[Wesfarmers] and it appeared to be only able to urge -
rather than command - that the company seek permission of 
its shareholders to issue the shares". (156) 
II the objections [to the Waitaki option announcement], 
appeared to be the size of the issue and the proposal 
not to treat all shareholders equally rather than the fact 
the company was raising money or issuing shares" . (157) 
(156) The Dominion 4/5/85 
(157) The Dominion 20/5/85 
• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
( i i ) 
-68-
Waitaki's option issue has presently stopped BIL partial 
takeover bid, BIL holding approximately 7% of Waitaki as at 
28th June 1985 (158) 
The target company, if contemplating such an option issue, 
should ensure it is in accordance with its Articles of 
Association . (159) 
Options to Existing Shareholders 
The use of issuing options to existing shareholders has 
been raised by people especially as a defence against 
partial takeovers.(160) Partial takeovers are very 
important as a shareholding of 30 - 35% would be considered 
as a controlling interest in most listed companies.(161) 
(158) O'Connor Grieve & Co 1985 Mid-Year Review dated 28th June 1985 page 28 
(159) See _!:!Q.9.9. v. Cramp horn supra n. 27. 
(160) A paper "The Use of Options As a Defence Against Partial Takeovers" 
(hereinafter referred to as "Lloyds") by Lloyds International Limited 
sup pli ed to the writer on the 25th January 1985. 
(161) Lloyd s i bid page 1. 
I· 
I 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
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The issue of options free, non-renounceable and not 
separable from the shares in respect of which they are 
issued, and convertible to equity(l62) on completion of a 
takeover would be a strategy open to a target company. 
This would create the same problems for a raider as 
discussed for loan stock previously.(163) 
(162) The equity shares issued at par (i.e. assumed to normally be at a 
discount from the target's present trading price) and the amount payable 
on subscription being small (between one cent and par). 
(163) See Moran v. Household International Inc. ("Household") No. 7730 (Del. 
Ch. Jan.29 1985) Delaware Court of Chancery. Household's preferred stock 
rights dividend plan allowed the shareholders to buy $200 worth of the 
merged company for $100 in the event of a hostile takeover. The Judge 
held the plan was legal, not intended for entrenchment of management and 
serving rational corporate purpose. American Bar Association Journal 
(1985) Volume 71 May 1985 page 122 and Fried Frank Memorandum supra n.69. 
Both the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada in the case of 
Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Industries Inc. No. CV-R-84-467-ECR (D. 
Nev. Mar.19 1985) and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York in the case of APL Corp. v. Johnson Controls Inc., No. 85-C-990 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar.25 1985) have refused to grant preliminary injunctions 
against similar preferred stock rights dividend plans. (Fried Frank 
Memorandum supra n.69). It has recently been reported that McDonalds, 
the US fast food chain, has granted to existing shareholders the right to 
acquire shares in the company at half price if an individual or a group 
acquired 20 per cent or more of McDonalds shares or announce a tender 
offer for 30 per cent or more (The Dominion 16/9/85 page 16). 
• • 
• • 
• • 
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It is believed it is difficult to defend a company against 
a partial takeover, even when it is at an obviously 
inadequate price. (164) Generally, a partial takeover 
launched from a shareholding of 20% has a high likelihood 
of success even if the offer price is widely regarded as 
inadequate.(165) 
The use of options to prevent a partial takeover is more 
limited in New Zealand than Australia because of New 
Zealand's basically unregulated takeover code. In 
Australia, generally a person/company would be prevented 
from exercising an option if that person/company would 
increase his/her/its shareholding beyond 20%.(166) 
(164) Lloyds No.160 page 1. 
(165) Lloyds ibid page 2. 
(166) Lloyds ibid page 4. The Australian Acquisition of Shares Code allows a 
shareholder to increase its shareholding beyond 20% only by way of a 
takeover offer (either full or partial) or through a limited number of 
special exemptions. Options can be exercised to increase a shareholding 
beyond 20% only if they were acquired during the course of an 
unconditional offer for all shares. 
• • 
• • 
• • 
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Split the Shares: 
A target company with a 11 high 11 share price may consider splitting 
the shares from one $1 shares to two $0.50 shares (167) or from 
one $0.10 shares to ten $0.01 (168) or whatever split is seen as 
desirable. 
The writer understands that this strategy is normally explained by 
the rationale that this will naturally lower the target company's 
share price and make shares in that target company more accessible 
to individual investors who may only have limited resources to 
purchase shares, especially as shares in companies listed on the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange are normally purchased in multiples of 
one hundred shares. 
(167) This was undertaken by Allflex Holdings Limited in 1984, and Cory Wright 
and Salmon Limited in 1985. 
(168) 
The writer does not believe that these share splits were intended as a 
defensive measure against a possible takeover of these companies. 
This is to be undertaken by Jarden Corporation Limited in 1985. 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
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One commentator believes there is little logic to support the belief that 
share splitting increases a target company's share price (per cent of 
nominal value) and detailed U.S. studies suggest such belief has no 
empirical validity. (169) That commentator believes share splits are 
often associated with good news about dividends, prospects, property 
revaluation and so on, and any casual evidence adduced for this strategy 
can usually be explained in this manner. (170) 
(169) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42. 
(170) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42 . 
• 
• • 
• 
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3.100 Raise the Dividend: 
Some target companies may be operating with excessively high dividend 
cover. (17l) 
A programme of lowering the cover over a number of years may 
be contemplated.(172) Shareholders are likely to favour a company with a 
faster than usual growth of dividends paid to shareholders.(173) 
Naturally a company would not wish to increase the dividend payable to 
shareholders if it would cause cash flow problems.(174) 
The market rewards predictability and growth.(1 74A) Therefore unexpected 
dividend cuts or a fluctuating dividend policy are not 
appreciated.(l 74B) 
(171) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42. 
High dividend cover means that the company is retaining profits and that 
such retained profits equal a "high" number of years multiplied by the 
amount required to be paid to meet the company's present divident payment 
to shareholders. 
(172) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42. 
(173) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42 . 
(174) If the target company does not have adequate resources to finance the 
increased dividend such increase may be a breach of duty on the part of 
the Directors of the target company - see Y.F. Danziger "Remedial 
Defensive Tactics Against Take-overs" (1983)4 The Company Lawyer (UK) 1 
page 4 and Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2465. A usual 
dividend policy is to pay out from 45% to 55% of after tax operating 
profits (R.A. Ross supra n.27D page 13) . 
(174A) R.A. Ross supra n.27D page 13. 
(174B) R.A. Ross ibid. 
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A planned programme over a number of years for lowering the dividend 
cover may be desirable to lessen possible cash flow problems and allow 
the company to increase the dividend payable if a takeover bid was made 
for that company.(175) 
3.110 Bonus Issue Made: 
As with the question of a target company raising the dividend a bonus 
issue may be contemplated. 
Bonus issues are particularly attractive to investors because of their 
capital gain, presently tax free. Bonus issues are now somewhat 
"expected" from the major New Zealand companies. 
In theory bonus shares should lower the share price of the Company in 
proportion to the issue of the bonus shares.(176) However, in practice, 
the share price normally is not discounted to the same proportion of 
bonus issue.(176A) 
The issue of bonus shares can be a defence strategy as it invariably 
makes the target company more expensive (more shares to purchase and a 
greater dividend commitment).(177) 
(175) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 42. 
Waitaki - NZR when making an interim dividend subsequent to the bid for a 
15 % shareholding by BIL announced an interim dividend of 7 cents per 
share of which 3.5 cents was tax free (1984 5.5 cents per share all tax 
free) - The Dominion 8/5/85 and Emco announced an early dividend after 
the bid by BIL - The Dominion 7/5/85. 
(176) After the budget in August 1985 the writer believes there will be an 
increase in bonus issues, rights issues and dividend investment schemes 
due to the taxation consequences. 
(176A) One commentator has stated: "Forget theory, bonus issues get headlines 
and share prices respond. They are a very potent weapon and a much 
better means of increasing the dividend rate" (R.A. Ross supra n.27D page 
14). 
(177) Recently used by Emco - "Emco had made a one-for-five payment and early 
dividend payment as a defence to the BIL bid" (The Dominion 7/5/85). 
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Bonus issues, rights issues at a deep discount, and, the writer believes, 
dividend reinvestment schemes are or will be popular with New Zealand 
shareholders and are seen by shareholders as a tangible expression of the 
target company's interest in its shareholders and they are normally an 
indication of the Director's confidence in the future.(177A) 
3.120 Management Buy-Out 
The management or a group of management, particularly if they already 
hold a significant shareholding in the target company, may believe that 
the share price is unrealistically low and may make a bid for all or part 
of the target company.(178) 
The management may state that the bid will emphasise their commitment 
to the target company and it would give stability for the long term 
growth of the target company. ( 179) 
Such management buy-outs are now quite common in the United States and 
sometimes such a buy-out is financed by giving securities over the target 
company's assets called "a leveraged buyout". Such leveraged buy-outs 
using the company's assets are illegal in New Zealand as it would mean 
the Company is assisting in the purchase of its own shares.(180) 
(177A) P. Mason supra n.27 page 4. 
(178) Seen recently in New Zealand in relation to Mainseal Limited, Freightways 
Limited, Wilkins & Davies Limited and Lion Breweries Limited. One 
commentator, Linda Sanders, The Dominion 6/7/85, has suggested that 
following the Ceramco - Atlas merger "it is possible something similar 
[a management buyout] could ultimately happen to Ceramco". 
(179) The Dominion 2/7/85 reported similar sentiments made by Douglas Myers 
concerning the bid for 10 percent of the share capital of Lion Breweries 
Limited by Tarragon Investments Limited (that company beneficially owned 
by Douglas Myers Managing Director of Lion Breweries Limited and John 
Fernyhough a Director). 
(180) Section 62 of the Companies Act 1955. See for background discussion on 
this matter T. van Zijl "Share repurchase - should be it lawful in New 
Zealand?" (1984) The Accountants' Journal page 202. 
• 
• 
• • 
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Management in such circumstances should, however, expect to answer the 
obvious (yet seldom asked) questions: 
(i) why had the Management involved in the buy-out not first, if not 
done so, informed the market that the share price was 
unrealistically low thereby giving the market and existing 
shareholders an opportunity to reasses the value of the target 
company shares or their holding (perhaps increasing their holding 
at the II cheap" price)? 
(ii) what had the involved Management done, prior to the bid, to allow 
the market to reassess the shares of the target company 
(information, dividends, bonus issues etc)? 
(iii) what has the involved Management done to show that it has not 
manipulated the low share price of the target company for their 
ovrn advantage? 
(iv) how does the involved Management justify their bid (a raider 
normally states it can operate the company more efficiently or 
economically - this reason will not normally be available to the 
involved Management as they operate the target company 
presently)? 
• 
• 
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3.130 Sell Assets/Loading Debts/Buy Assets 
("Scorched Earth" or "Golden Jewel") 
"Scorched earth" is a self-destructive strategy in which the target 
company seeks to discourage a takeover by making itself less attractive. 
(181) Some target companies have done this by selling the very assets 
the raider wanted (also called the "golden jewel strategy" (182)). In 
addition, a target may make itself unpalatable arranging for: 
(i) substantial loans which fall due at once in the event the target 
company is acquirect,(183) or, 
(181) Time - 4/3/85 page 35. 
(182) See Baigent v. B. Mel Wallace supra n.26 Prichard J stated: 
"It would, I think, be only in the most extreme case, if ever, that the 
Court would find that the decision of a board of directors to sell one of 
the company's assets was an abuse of power unless, of course, the 
directors obtained some personal advantage forrn the sale". 
See paragraph 448 of the Stock Exchange Code which states: 
"Any sale or disposal by the directors of the company's (or group's) main 
undertaking shall be subject to prior approval by shareholders in general 
meeting." 
(183) P. Solman & Thomas Friedman - Life and Death on the Corporate 
Battlefield - How companies Win, Lose, Survive - Simon & Schuster 1982, 
page 114 noted Marathon Oil agreed to se 11 it's much prized oil and gas 
reserves to U.S. Steel if Mobil outbid U.S. Steel for Marathon. This was 
later ruled illegal however Mobil bid for Marathon was also illegal on 
anti-trust grounds. See also Thompson v. Enstar Corporation No. 7641 
(Del. Ch. June 20 1984) and DMG, Inc v. Aegis Corporation No. 7619 (Del • 
Ch June 29, 1984). (Fried Frank Memorandum supra n.69). 
• 
• 
• 
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(iii) a substantial purchase of assets or shares of a third party on 
terms unfavourable in the event the target company is acquired 
(184). 
The Stock Exchange Code requires a company seeking to divest itself of 
the company's (or group's) "main undertaking" to make such sale or 
disposal subject to prior approval by shareholders in general meeting. 
(185). The sale of assets by the target company may have the following 
advantages.(185A): 
(i) the target company loses its attractiveness to the ~aider; 
(ii) the assets may be producing losses and the balance sheet and 
profit and loss statements may be improved by the asset sale; 
(iii) the value placed on these assets by a third party may make the 
raider's takeover price (assuming a takeover raid has been made) 
appear inadequate . 
(184) See also paragraphs 3.70 and 3.92 of this paper . 
(185) See paragraph 448 of the Stock Exchange Code. This paragraph was amended 
as from 1 July 1985. Previously such sale of a company "main 
undertaking" only had to be ratified by shareholders in general meeting. 
See recently the criticism of the information supplied to shareholders by 
the Directors of R. & W. Hellaby Limited in relation to its sale of 
company assets (The Dominion 8/8/85 page 12). 
(185A) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 pages 47-48 . 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
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4.00 DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES AFTER A TAKEOVER BID IS MADE 
4.01 
A number of defensive strategies mentioned under 3.00 may also be 
available even in the face of a takeover bid. 
Urging Shareholders Not to Accept the Offer/Issue "Don't Sell" Notice/ 
Director's Recommendation 
The most obvious first defence is for the Directors of the target company 
to reject the takeover offer.(185B) Any response should be forceful and 
in a way that shareholders of the target company believe the Directors 
are acting in the shareholders interest rather than self-interest,(186) 
remembering that generally all companies are for sale at a price and 
unsolicited takeover bids are never welcome to Boards of Directors but 
always to shareholders.(186A) 
(1858) The initial reponse can be "Guns Blazing" or "Stonewalling" (both 
expressions are self-explanatory) - S. Higgs, W. Chant, and R. Halstead 
supra n.27C pages 10-12. 
(186) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43-44. Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 8. 
(186A) S. Higgs, W. Chant, and R. Walstead supra n.27C page 11. 
• 
• • 
•• 
• • 
-80-
A response seeking to maintain the status quo is for the Directors of the 
target company to issue a 11 don 1 t sell" notice, this may in fact be done 
once a takeover bid is rumoured.(187) The Directors of the target 
company will urge shareholders to resist the offer, usually adding that 
further important information will be forthcoming.(188) Key shareholders 
may be approached, the target company must realise that different types 
of shareholders are capable of being influenced in different ways.(188A) 
The Directors of the target company do not have to make a recommendation 
in relation to a bid made by a raider.(188B) 
(187) This pre-emptive "don't sell" notice was issued by Cable-Price Downer 
Limited when takeover rumours were circulating (The Dominion 6/5/85). 
(188) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 3. 
(188A) S. Higgs, W. Chant and R. Halstead supra n.27C page 6. For example 
institutional investors will be mainly interested in the opportunity cost 
(if any) of not accepting a takeover bid. Hence the greater the premium 
the bid is over the prebid market price, the greater the potential 
opportunity cost, and the more inclined they will be to accept the bid. 
(1888) See for background information on recommendations by Directors of target 
companies . 
Y.F. Danziger "The Right of Target Companies' Directors to Stay Silent 
Upon a Bid" (1985) 5 The Company Lawyer No. 5 page 213 (UK). 
M. Agius "Corporate Attack and Defence" (1984) 190 The Accountant 415 
page 420 (UK) . 
• 
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4.02 Criticise the Offer: 
The takeover offer may be criticised on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
(i) the offer is inadequate(189) particularly if for control of the 
target (190); 
(ii) the offer values the target•s shares at less than book-value(l91); 
(iii) the offer is less than the recent market price of the target 
company•s shares(l92); 
(iv) the offer lacks commercial logic(l93); 
(189) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43. If a share exchange is offered it may 
be alleged that such an exchange based on current prices is unrealistic . 
Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 3 . 
(190) It is common for a share price of 20-30% above the existing share price 
to be paid for 11 control 11 of a company. See N.L. Scheinkestel 11 Control -
How to Regulate an Elusive Concept 11 supra n.151. 
(191) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 3. 
(192) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 3. 
(193) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 47. 
Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 8. 
• 
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An offer is worth resisting, even if the takeover seems inevitable, when 
the premium offered on the current share price is likely to be higher if 
there is resistance from the target company 1 s Directors.(194) 
Criticism of the offer is normally done with reference to a valuation of 
the company, and the following should be considered in relation to the 
valuation: 
(a) the credibility of the valuer is paramount therefore choose your 
valuer very carefully; 
(b) realise who is most likely to take notice of the valuation; 
(c) be aware of the basis of the valuation (assumptions/methodology/ 
analysis); 
( d) timing in producing the valuation and any market reaction to the 
valuation must be anticipated.(194A) 
(194) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 43. 
Author Un kn own 11 Tak e-Over Defence Tactics (1984) 6 Company Secretary 1 s 
Review page unkn ovm (he reinafter referred to as 11 Co.Sec.Review Article") 
(UK) • 
(194A) R. Grant supra n.49 pages 2-5. 
• 
• 
• • 
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4.03 Criticise the Raider/Ascertain the Raider's Objective: 
The criticism of the raider may include such matters as its general 
management philosophy,(195) its history of bad labour relations,<196) its 
poor past performance operating its own business,(197) its inexperience 
in the type of business activities engaged in by the target company(l98), 
its acting illegally or contrary to the Stock Exchange Code (if listed), 
or its giving a false impression in relation to its bid.(198A) 
You may wish not to immediately criticise the raider or its takeover bid 
until more information is available on the raider's rationale for the 
bid. In this regard the target company may encourage early contact 
between the raider and the target company and their representatives and 
advisors. It is important that the target company's personnel are 
experienced in the art of listening and experienced in illiciting 
information from people while at the same time giving away as little 
information as possible (if anything).(198B) 
(195) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2463. It was illustrated in the 
takeover bid by BIL for Emco where it was reported that the Chairman of 
Emco alleged that BIL planned to dismember Emco (The Evening Post 27/4/85). 
Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 8 . 
(196) Weinberg and Blank ibid. 
(197) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 pages 3-4 and pages 8-9. 
(198) 
Co.Sec.Review Article supra 194 page (?). 
Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 pages 3-4 and page 9. This was reportedly 
raised by Kiwifruit Industries Limited in commenting on a takeover bid 
for 51% of the share capital of that company by Charter Corporation 
Limited (The Dominion 9/7/85). 
(198A) Y.F. Daniger supra n.174 page 9. 
(1988) S. Higgs, W. Chant and R. Halstead supra n.27C page 6. 
• 
• 
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4.04 Disclosure of New Information 
The disclosure of information to the market has already been discussed 
(199) and it is believed that tactically it is more effective, as a 
defence against takeovers, to disclose favourable information prior 
rather than subsequent to a takeover bid having been made.(200) The 
delay in disclosing the information may cause criticism to be levelled at 
the Directors of the target company alleging shareholders have been kept 
in ignorance of the true value of their shares and shareholders selling 
prior to disclosure may have been unfairly disadvantaged.(201) 
(199) See Paragraph 3.20 of this paper. 
(200) Weinberg and Blank supra n 27 paragrph 2460. 
(201) Weinberg and Blank ibid. 
• 
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The following Stock Exchange Code requirements in section 6 headed the Takeover 
Code are relevant to listed companies. 
(202) 
(203) 
(204) 
(205) 
(i) No material information is to be withheld by either the raider 
or the target company and all material information made available 
to any one shareholder in his capacity as shareholder, is to be 
made available to a11.(202) 
(ii) A false or uninformed must not be allowed to develop by the 
raidaer or the target cocmpanya in the shares of either.(203) 
(iii) The Board of Directors and the shareholders of the target 
company are to be given sufficient informatio~ to enable them to 
make an informed investment judgement. The source of the 
information should be made clear.(204) 
(iv) If the Directors of the target company, having considered all 
relevant effects including the present price of the company's 
shares on the market, its past record and its immediate prospects, 
is in any doubt as to the best interests, of the shareholders, it 
is recommended that it take independent investment advice. If 
outside advice is taken, shareholders should be advised of its 
source and substance.(205) 
Paragraph 604 of the Stock Exchange Code. 
Paragraph 605 of the Stock Exchange Code 
Paragraph 607 of the Stock Exchange Code 
Paragraph 608 of the Stock Exchange Code 
• 
• • 
(206) 
(207) 
(208) 
• • (209) 
(210) 
( 211) 
• • 
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(v) The Directors of the target company is not to take action to 
thwart an offer unless they honestly believe that acceptance is 
not in the best interests of shareholders. If the Directors 
considers the offer too low, or reasonably believef a higher offer 
is in prospect, it should so advise shareholders. The seeking of 
a higher offer is to be confirmed to one reasonably in prospect 
and is not to be unduly prolonged or used purely as a device to 
thwart or delay an unwelcome bid.(206) 
The new information may relate to the following(207): 
( a) 
(b) 
( C) 
( d) 
( e) 
revaluation of assets; 
€ 
forsast of profits; 
disclosing new developments are underway; 
fo i ast of dividends or increase in dividend; 
share price. 
It is a standard defence policy for the Directors of the target company 
to get an up-to-date property valuation and show that the net assets are 
worth substantially more than has been reported previously.(208) This 
strategy may raise two possible problems for the Directors of the target 
company, (i) a higher asset value may mean a lower return is being earned 
on the assets than previously thought(209) and (ii) the Directors may 
find it difficult to not recommend agreement with a revised offer by a 
raider in line with the asset revaluation (210). Valuation figures may 
be open to dispute because of the different methods of carrying out a 
valuation. (211) 
Paragraph 609 of the Stock Exchange Code 
M. Agius supra n.188 page 7. Co. Sec Review Article n.194. 
S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 46. See also R. Grant supra n.49. 
Ibid Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 9. 
Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2462. 
S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 46. See Z.P. Matolcsy "The Evaluation of 
Independent Expert 1 s Advice on Takeover Offers : An Economics-Finance 
Perspective" (1981-82)10 Australian Business Law Review page 99. 
• 
• 
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An increased profit forecast (better than the market expects or the 
raider implies) or good comparitive profit forecast with companies in 
similar industries to target company may be a very useful defence 
strategy (providing changed accounting policies are not the cause) in 
showing how well the target company is performing under the present 
management and indicating future envisaged benefits for 
shareholders.(212) Profit forecasts also may be disputed.(213) 
New developments may be announced for the target company. Such 
developments may include new orders received, new markets achieved, new 
products developed, management changes, and the sale or purchase of 
assets . 
(212) Co. Sec Review Article n.194. Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 pages 4 & 9. 
S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 46. Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 
2461. See also R. Grant supra n.49. 
(213) This has recently occured during the takeover bid by Adelaide Steamship 
Co. Limited ( 11 Adelaide 11 ) of Wormald International Limited ( 11 Wormald 11 ), in 
Australia. Adelaide queries various profit projections given by Wormald 
and its advisors. See The Dominion 13/6/85 headed 11 Wormald defends 
profit projection" and The Australian 12/6/85 (Tim Allerton) headed 
11 Wormald attacks Adsteam over letter to holders." 
A dispute as to profit projections also occured when it seems a profit 
projection was made by the Directors of Sovereign Gold Mines Limited (In 
Receivership) in response to a takeover offer by Westside Traders Limited 
- The Dominion 3/8/85. 
• I 
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Disclosure of the new information may be carried out by letters or 
advertisements addressed to the shareholders of the target company; press 
statements or interviews; "official" profit forecasts and 
advertisements.(214) 
The matters of dividends(215) and share price have been discussed 
previously in this paper.(216) 
(214) Y.F. Danziger supra n. page 4. Co. Sec. Review Article n.194 page 
M. Agius supra n.188 page 420. 
11 many shareholder~ pay more attention to the advice they receive from 
the press and so both sides tend to take the greatest possible care to 
lobby the press with a view to achieving its support for their case. 
Advertisements are also widely used." 
(215) Co. Sec. Review Article 194 page states: 
"The main idea of a dividend forecast is to off er support for the share 
price should a bid fail." 
(216) See paragraph 3QO (Increase the Share Price) and paragraph 3.100 (Raise 
the Dividend). 
• 
• • 
• • 
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4.05 Bid for Raider ("Pac-Man") 
This strategy is named after the popular video game where the target 
company turns about and makes a takeover bid for the raider.(216A) 
In New Zealand the most notable use of this strategy was by NZFP in 
1983/84 against Wattie/Goodman after those companies made a partial 
takeover of NZFP(217) 
For this strategy to be viable the target company must have: 
(i) Access to the funds needed to finance the counter bid. 
(ii) Resolute management determined that the target company must remain 
independant.(218) 
(216A) TIME 4/3/85 page 35. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 pages 46-47. 
(217) See S. McArley "New Zealand Forest Products and Wattie: Implications for 
New Zealand Securities Law" Research paper for the Law of Bodies 
Corporate and Unincorporate LL.M. (Laws 523) Victoria University of 
Wellington 1984. 
(218) A. Sloan supra n.134. 
See also S. McArley ibid in his discussion of the strategy that had to be 
undertaken by Goodmans to ensure Watties remain independant subsequent to 
the bid by NZFP. 
• 
• • 
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Share Dealing 
( a) Purchase target company's shares by its Directors or third 
parties: 
The target company can not purchase its own shares(219) however 
the Directors of the target company or "friendly" third parties 
may undertake the purchase of shares in the target company.(220) 
It is hoped that the purchase of the target company's shares will 
reduce the number of "free" shares available to the raider and 
tend to push up the share price.(221) 
The Directors of the target company, if listed, must ensure a 
false or uniformed market does not develop.(222) 
(219) Secti on 62 of the Companies Ac t 1955. See also T. van Zijl supra n.180. 
(220) Y. F. Danziger supra n.174 page 5. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49. 
Weinste i n and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2456. "Friendly" third parties 
might include the target company's merchant bank buying shares for 
various funds it may manage. 
(221) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 5. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49. 
(222) Paragraph 605 of the Stock Exchange Code. See also paragraph 509 of the 
Stock Exchange Code whi ch requires a listed company to notify the 
Exchange if buying or selling a beneficial interest in 5% or more of the 
issued shares of another listed company. 
' 
' . 
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If, after becoming aware of a possible takeover offer, the 
Directors of a listed target company wish to deal in any of either 
shares of the target company or the raider for themselves they 
must first notify the Stock Exchange. The Directors must also 
disclose immediately to the Stock Exchange that they have dealt in 
such shares and disclose the details of volume and price.(223) 
The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the ability of the 
Directors of the target company or "friendly" third parties to 
purchase sufficient shares to materially effect a takeover 
bid.(224) 
(223) Paragraph 603 of the Stock Exchange Code. The information may be 
published by the Stock Exchange. 
(224) Y.F. Danziger supras n.174 page 11 . 
• 
• 
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Purchase/sell raider's shares by the target company or its 
Directors: 
The target company may encourage friendly third parties to buy the 
raider's shares to create an opportunity for those shareholjers to 
bring a derivative action against the raider in order to restrain 
its actions.(225) 
If the bid by the raider is on a share exchange basis the target 
company or friendly third parties(226) may sell shares of the 
raider in an attempt to depress the share price of the raider so 
that the terms of the share exchange are less attractive to 
shareholders of the target company.(227) 
(225) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 pages 5 and 11. See also Weinberg & Blank 
supra n.27 paragraph 2480. 
(226) For example, the target company's merchant bank selling shares of the 
raider held by various funds under their control. 
(227) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49. Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 pages 5 and 
ll. 
• 
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Appeal to The Courts: 
In the United States, the target company often issue court proceedings in 
the Courts on the grounds of possible breaches of U.S. securities or 
anti-trust legislation, or possible improper conduct by the raider.(228) 
In New Zealand and the United Kingdom such a strategy is rarely taken, 
presumably because of the difficulties the target company or its 
directors have in establishing grounds for a cause of action.(229) 
The writer believes that litigation in the Courts by a target is likely 
to increase because of the following factors: 
(i) the New Zealand Court of Appeal has taken a less restrictive 
interpretation for the standing required for a party to initiate 
court proceedings.(230) 
(228) S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 45. Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 
2479, a Fried Frank Memorandum supra n.69 and Sullilvan and Cromwell, 
supra n.270. 
(229) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2480 C.W. Forbes supra n.24 page 
72. 
(230) Finnigan & Recordon v. N.Z. Rugby Football Union (Inc.) (CA 66/85). This 
case is already being seen as a guiding decision by the Commerce 
Commission in the case Bulk Gas Users Group, the Secretary of Energy and 
The Auckland Gas Company Limited Decision No. 136, pages 6-7. 
' . 
' . 
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(ii) an increasing awareness as to possible causes of action including: 
(a) attempting to enforce legislative requirements or being a 
party to proceedings under legislative requirements (eg the 
Commerce Act 1975)(231); 
( b) issuing proceedings based on an allegation that the raider 
or parties associated to the raider have utilised 
(confidential) information (especially if the raider has 
appointed a Director to the target company) belonging to 
the target company.(232) 
(231) See paragraph 4.08 of this paper. The writer believes in the near future 
the strategy of a United States target company in issuing proceeding for 
possible breaches of securities or anti-trust legislation will be more 
available in New Zealand if the personal view of the Chairman of the 
Securities Commission (C.I. Patterson) is adopted in the New Zealand 
legislation to require that "pauses and publicity are desirable features 
in the takeover process to induce ... competition" (Address by 
Mr C.I. Patterson to the Seminar on Mergers and Takeovers 29th August 
1985 n.3 page 25). There will be probability of a new Commerce Act and 
see also chapter 7 "Proposals for a New Takeover Law in New Zealand" of 
the Securities Commission Report supra 6. 
(232) The U.K. example of the offer by Johnson & Firth Brown for the capital of 
Dunford and Elliot - Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2480, 
however such an allegation viewed sceptically by Heron J. in Trounce & 
another v. N.C.F. Kaiapoi Limited supra n.26. 
• I 
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(iii) a recognition that litigation can be very effective as a defence 
strategy in certain circumstances, particularly when obtaining an 
injunction to restrain a raider, and litigation illustrates that 
the target company's Board of Directors will pursue every avenue 
to prevent a takeover bid.(233) 
A target company should not ignore the fact that the raider may also use 
Court litigation.(234) 
(233) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 10 queried why target companies do not 
utilise court litigation more often. S. Higgs, W. Chant and R. Halstead 
supra n.27C page 5 note an escalation in use of litigation in Australia, 
in particular litigation against directors and see such litigation as an 
influence on those involved in the takeover battle. (See the report of 
legal action against Alliance Holdings [an Australian company] and its 
directors by FAI Insurances - The Dominion 24/9/85 page 14.) This 
perception of litigation as playing an important role in indicating to 
the raider the resolve of the target company is also confirmed in the US 
context in the article by M. Billard "Self-Defence" (1985) The American 
Lawyer page 110 which discusses the use of litigation in the takeover bid 
by Mesa Petroleum for Unocal (page 11). 
(234) See Baigent & Others v. D. Mel. Wallace Limited & Others supra n.26, and 
Trounce and Another v. N.C.F. Kaiapoi Limited supra n.26 where Heron J. 
granted interim injunctions: 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
prohibiting Kaiapoi and the directors (other than Stevens Group 
directors) of Kaiapoi from acting pursuant to a resolution which 
formed a committee of directors, to consider, a takeover bid by 
Stevens Group consisting of all directors of Kaiapoi other than 
such directors appointed by Stevens Group. The Commitee was to 
have full power to bind Kaiapoi. 
prohibiting Kaiapoi and the directors (other than Stevens Group 
directors) preventing the Stevens directors from exercising their 
rights as directors from exercising their rights as directors of 
Kaiapoi in relation to the takeover. 
• 
• 
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4.08 Intervention by the Commerce Commission: 
The Commerce Commission's main purpose under the Commerce Act 1975 is to 
regulate the markets for, and dealings in, goods and services other than 
securities. Part III of the Commerce Act 1975 establishes a takeover 
review procedure which is confined to monopoly and competition 
(antitrust) considerations.(235) 
The proceedings of the Commerce Commission and the Examiner of Trade 
Practices under Part III of the Commerce Act 1975 may allow the target 
company to participate in the proceedings of the Commerce 
Commission.(236) 
(235) See paragraph 2.32 of this paper. 
(236) The administrative law rules in relation to natural justice, the writer 
believes, may allow the target company to issue proceedings in the Court 
alleging that the target company has been wrongly excluded from the 
proceedings of the Commerce Commission or the Examiner of Trade 
Practices. 
See J. Collinge "Merger and Takeover Policy and Procedures in New 
Zealand" supra n.12 and M. Hill "The Evolution of New Zealand Merger 
Control and its Administration by the Office of the Examiner of 
Commercial Practices" supra n.12 for a general discussion on procedures . 
• 
• • 
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The target company may be able to obtain a Commerce Commission decision, 
or "draft decision 11 (237) favourable to its defence stragety(238) or 
utilise or seek to be utilised other provisions of the Commerce Act 
1975. (239) 
(237) See for a discussion of Commercial Commission "draft decisions" the paper 
by J. Collinge "Merger and Takeover Policy in New Zealand" supra n.12 
pages 7 to 8. 
(238) The writer believes this occured such that Cory Wright Salmon Limited 
withdrew their application for the consent of the Commerce Commission to 
take over Tolley Industries subsequent to an unfavourable "draft 
decision" or "preliminary view" to the takeover having been given by the 
Commission ( CSW/To 11 ey (1984) 4 NZAR 361) and J. Co 11 i nge II Towards a 
Competition Policy in New Zealand" supra n.12 page 26) and S. Lofthouse 
"Competition Policies as Takeover Defences" (1984) Journal of Business 
Law 320 (UK). 
(239) For example: 
(i) Section 81H: The Commission may restrain proposed transactions on 
the application of the Examiner or any other person with a 
substantial interest in certain limited circumstances. 
(ii) Section 73A: Investigation of merger or takeover not coming with 
the Third Schedule of the Commerce Act 1975 by the Examiner at the 
direction of the Commission. 
• 
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The writer believes that a target company will be able to use the 
Commerce Act as a defence strategy in a growing number of circumstances 
in the future for the following reasons: 
(i) a more liberal interpretation for the standing required for a 
party to be part of proceeding.(239A) 
( i i ) the proposed replacement of the Commerce Act 1975 with the new 
Commerce Bill 1985. The Commerce Bill 1985 changes the 
competition test for mergers and takeovers from 11 eff ect i ve 
competition" to a "substantial lessening of competition 11 (239B) and 
introduces law relating to restrictive trade practices.(239C) 
Both changes will allow challenges to be made while the Commission 
and/or the Courts establish guideline interpretations of the 
changes. (240) 
(239A) Finnigan & Recordan v. N.Z. Rugby Football Union (Inc.) supra n.230 and 
Bulk Gas Users Group, the Secretary of Energy and the Auckland Gas 
Company Limited supra n.230. 
(239B) Section 66(3) of the Commerce Bill 1985. See also a paper by Donald G. 
Kempf,Jr "Antitrust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions : Course 
Materials" for the American Management Association Course in Mergers and 
Acquisitions. 
(239C) Part II of the Commerce Bill 1985. The Australian Trade Practices 
Commission has stated to scrutinise takeovers under legislation similar 
• • to the proposed N.Z. legislation - Australian Trade Practices Reporter 
No. 260 22 August 1985 pages 5 and 6. 
(240) See N. Sallee "Landmark decisions expected with Commerce Law" National 
' I • Business Review 17.6.85. 
' . 
' 
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4.09 Intervention by The Securities Commission: 
The Securities Commission has the power to investigate in depth and 
comment on a particular company takeover and such power may be exercised 
while the takeover attempt is in progress.(241) 
However, while the Securities Commission has investigated various 
takeovers such investigations are normally after the takeover had been 
completed(242) and the Securities Commission has only a power to publish 
a report or make recommendations to the Minister of Justice.(243) 
(241) Section 10 of the Securities Act 1978, the case of City Realties Limited 
v. The Securities Commission supra n.15C. 
(242) The latest being an inquiry into dealings in shares of Emco Group Limited 
(Securities Commission Terms of Reference dated 25th July 1985). For 
press reports of the inquiry see The Dominion 16/8/85 (page 12) and 
17/8/85 (page 17) and The Evening Post 17/8/85 (page 14). 
(243) Sections 10 and 28A of the Securities Act 1978. The writer gives a 
limited interpretation to Section 17 of the Securities Act 1978, agreeing 
with view expressed in Darvell and Clarke Securities Law in New Zealand 
supra 15 paragraph 3.16. 
A report, although only with recommendations, can have a substantial 
effect on company's or person's reputation and business standing . 
' 
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The Securities Act 1981 and possible intervention by the Securities 
Commission would be relevant if a takeover offer was made by "standing in 
the market" by a raider and involved a share swap. It may be argued in 
such circumstances that a prospectus is required to be issued.(244) 
The writer believes that the Securities Act 1981 will be of greater 
importance to defence strategies if the legislation is amended to adopt 
the personal view of the Chairman of the Securities Commission by 
requiring II pauses and publicity ... in the takeover process ... 11 (245) 
(244) See n.15A and n.158 for references. 
(245) Address by Mr C.I. Patterson to the Seminar on Mergers and Takeovers 
29 August 1985 n.3 page 25. 
See also Chapter 7 "Proposals for a New Takeover Law in New Zealand" the 
Securities Commission Report supra n.6 . 
I' 
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4.10 Threaten Management Resignation ("The Neutron Bomb" defence): 
4.11 
(246A) 
(246) 
(247) 
(248) 
(249) 
The "Neutron Bomb" defence strategy is that the structure of the target 
company will be there, but the people will be gone.(254A) 
The threat of management resignation will be most powerful in companies 
where a few key individuals are disproportionately important, especially 
if there is a chance that such management will set up directly 
competitive enterprises.(246) 
Urging the Raider's Shareholders to Oppose their Board's Takeover Bid 
for the Target Company: 
This strategy is used only very rarely.(247) 
The Directors of the target company may argue the following: 
(i) alleged breach of fudiciary duties or duties of care and skill by 
the Directors of the raider; 
( i i ) the lack of experience or ability by the raider in managing the 
business of the target; or 
(iii) that the takeover expenses and funds raised will be a heavy burden 
on the raider.(248) 
The Directors of the target company should be careful not to argue that 
the target company is not a worthy target, since the Directors of the 
target company will later face difficulties in convincing the target 
company's shareholders not to accept the raider's offer.(249) 
A. Vrisakis and G. Samuel supra n.33 page 11. 
s. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49. Y.F. Danziger supra n.1 74 page 12. 
Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 13. 
y. F. Danziger ibid. 
y. F. Danziger ibid. 
• 
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11 Standstill 11 Agreements: 
A 11 standstill 11 agreement is typically entered into by a target company 
and a raider. The raider agrees to cease (at a standstill) its 
acquisition of shares in the target company, typically for a defined 
period unless further acquisitions are approved by the target company's 
management. (250) 
Such agreements may give the management of the target company a long-term 
"friendly party 11 .(251) 
A person or company, whether a raider or not, agreeing to execute such an 
agreement in relation to its purchase of a target company's shares may, 
in return, be given access to confidential information from the target 
company. ( 252) 
(250) The most publically known 11 standstill 11 agreement is the 
Wat tie/Goodman/NZFP agreements, somewhat more complicated than merely 
between target company and raider, and described in paragraph 3.50 of 
this paper. 
Such agreements are commonly used in the U.S., especially after a target 
company has purchased its own shares from a raider, and as a condition of 
the purchase of its own shares t he target company requires the raider to 
side a 11 standstill 11 agreement. However in New Zealand presently a 
company can not purchase or assist in the purchase of its own shares 
(Sect ion 62 of the Companies Act 1955 and T. Van Ziji supra n.180) . 
(251) J. C. Coffee Jr. supra n.72 page 1262 (footnote 353). Such 11 standstill 11 
agreement partner may not always remain 11 friendly 11 see the case of 
Enterra Corporation v. SGS Associates E.D. Pa. Jan 9 1985 (U.S.) where 
the Court found valid corporate purposes for 11 standstill 11 agreement (one 
partner to such an agreement was seeking to avoid its contractual 
obligations). Information from Fried Frank Memorandum supra n.69 . 
(252) J.C. Coffee ibid page 1261. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
i e 
-103-
There is the recommendation in the U.S. that if such "standstill" 
agreement is to be effective for greater than one year then the 
shareholders of the target company should be required to approve the 
target company entering into such agreement.(252A) 
(252A) J.C. Coffee ibid page 1262 . 
See also Recommendation 37 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Advisory Committee Report on Tender Offers July 8 1983 (page 38) . 
• 4 .13 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(253) 
(254) • 
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Use Business, Social and Political Relationships: 
This paper has discussed the importance of a target company selecting top 
advisors.(253) 
Further lobbying may be envisaged of the following: 
( a) 
( b) 
The target Company's Brokers: 
The brokers may help reinforce shareholders' loyalty by keeping 
them generally informed of the target company's progress.(254) 
The target company's customers, suppliers & distributors: 
Illiciting a statement by the target company's customers, 
suppliers and/or distributors that the relationship(s) with the 
target company might be terminated if the present management of 
the target company is removed may have a chilling influence on a 
raider.(255) 
See paragraph 316 of this paper. 
Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 13. 
Y .F. Danziger ibid page 12. 
S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49. 
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The target company's labour force and unions: 
The support of the target company's labour force and unions, 
particularly if redundancies or rationalisation seems likely by 
the raider, can be very useful to a target company in attempting 
to thwart a takeover bid.(256) This approach can be more 
effective if the target company can refer to specific examples 
where the raider has taken over a company and redundancies or 
"dismemberment" has occured. (257) 
The influence of the company's labour force may be magnified when 
a target company is under a takeover bid if the target company has 
issued a significant shareholding to the target company's labour 
force or the target company's labour force superannuation 
scheme.(25S) 
Institutional Shareholders: 
Institutional shareholders of the target company, who may have 
less loyalty to the target company itself, will normally be very 
conscious of and affected by the views of the management and the 
labour force of the target company to a takeover bid by a 
raider.(259) Forceful lobbying by management and the labour force 
may influence the attitude of institutional shareholders to a 
takeover bid.(260) 
(256) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 page 12. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49. 
(257) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2476 . 
(258) See paragraph 3.70 of this paper on the issue of shares to "friendly" 
third parties. 
(259) Weinberg and Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2476 . 
(260) Weinberg and Blank ibid. 
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Political lobbying at national, regional or local level: 
Nationalism or patriotic sentiments may be called upon if the 
raider is 11 foreign 11 , such sentiments may be aimed at 
shareholders(261) and governmental bodies if government consent is 
needed for the takeover.(262) Also regional or local interests 
may be relevant, particularly if there is a significant regional 
or local shareholding and the takeover may affect regional or 
local employment or development.(263) 
(261) This is illustrated in the possible bid by Elders-IXL Limited 
(Australian) for Allied-Lyons PLC (British) when the chairman of 
Allied-Lyons PLC in discussing the possible bid stated: 
(262) 
II We are supposed to live with that for up to six weeks while 
this Australian company makes up its mind. 11 (The Dominion 7/9/85 
page 13). 
See also The Evening Post 7/9/85 page 13 article on the matter headed 
"Ambitious Elders 'cheeky, un-British"' . 
This was illustrated in the proposed takeover by ACI (Australia) of AHI 
(New Zealand). The writer understands ACI 1 s bid was turned down by the 
N.Z. Minister of Finance after strong lobbying by New Zealand interests . 
Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 pages 12-13. S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49. 
Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraphs 2477 and 2478. 
(263) Y.F. Danziger supra n.174 pages 12-13 . 
S. Lofthouse supra n.28 page 49 . 
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Individual shareholders: 
The 11 loyalty 11 for 11 their company" may be illicited from small 
individual shareholders especially if such shareholders have held 
their shares for a long time.(264) The shareholders may attach 
importance to the name of 11 their 11 company and the independance of 
its business.(265) 
CONCLUSION 
Although defence strategies against takeovers will vary in accordance 
with the circumstances of each target company, and according to the 
identify of the likely raider, the writer believes certain practical 
steps are available to all companies in order to make that company less 
likely to incur an uninvited significant change of ownership . 
A company must be aware that: 
(i) 11 IT" may be a target company and recognise why it would be a 
target company for a possible raider . 
(ii) It should have developed some long term objectives for the company 
(ie where the company sees its position in its particular 
industry), planned how it intends to achieve such objectives and 
communicated such objectives to its shareholders. 
(264) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2476. See footnote 62 of Weinberg 
& Blank ibid for example. 
(265) Weinberg & Blank supra n.27 paragraph 2476 . 
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Any defence strategies should have as their initial basis the following: 
(a) Be prepared. Don't wait to recieve a takeover bid before 
contemplating defence strategies . 
(b) Don't panic. Don't take a "knee-jerk" reaction to the possibility 
or eventuality of a takeover bid as it may be regretted later . 
( C) Don't ignore the "key" players in a takeover situation - the 
target company's shareholders. Factual, comprehensive and planned 
information should be made available to a target company's 
shareholders on a continual basis. The shareholders must be 
motivated so acceptance of a takeover bid is seen by the 
shareholders not to be in their own best interest. 
If a takeover bid is received the Board of Directors of the target 
company must: 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
Give guidance to the shareholders of the takeover company by 
making a response in a forceful manner and in a manner that 
encourages the shareholders of the target company to believe the 
Directors are acting in the shareholder~ interest rather than 
their own self interest . 
Recognise their fudiciary duties to the target company and its 
shareholders. 
Have a clear perception as to the company's position in a takeover 
situation. 
Clearly and unequivocably communicate their attitute to the bid to 
the raider taking cognizance of all the remedies available 
(including court litigation). 
Fighting a takeover is like fighting a war and persistance and pugnacity 
is essential to a successful takeover defence strategy . 
• 
• 
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~• 
Aaron, R.S • 
Agius, M. 
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